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1.1. Motivation 
Recently, several journalists’ investigations have directed the general 
public’s attention to the overall tax burden of several, large global players by 
providing anecdotal evidence for the tax planning strategies of these firms. 
Amongst others, one of the mostly known and discussed examples is Google Inc. 
with its so-called “Double Irish” and “Dutch Sandwich” structures. These tax 
planning structures enabled Google to shift most of its foreign income to Bermuda 
with paying hardly any taxes on the way. Thereby, the firm reduced its Effective 
Tax Rate (ETR) on foreign income to 2.4 percent in 2010.1 The discussion about 
large multinational entities (MNEs) avoiding taxes has already been in full 
progress when the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists posted a 
database containing confidential documents about secret advanced tax rulings 
between Luxembourg’s tax authorities and several firms and thereby stimulated 
the debate further in 2014.2 Till this day, the last event attracting immense 
attention has been the publication of the Panama Papers in 2016 uncovering 
information about shell corporations being established in Panama amongst other 
reasons to save taxes.3  
Most of this anecdotal evidence highlights low ETR measures that have 
been reached by using the gaps and frictions which arise when two sovereign 
countries’ tax rules interact. As a result the main business’ location and the 
country levying taxes on most of the respective profits differ in these cases. 
Although being legal, these tax avoidance strategies are inconsistent with the 
intention and purpose of tax law (Kadet, 2016). To hinder these activities, the 
                                                          
1
 Cf. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/30/AR2010103000034.html. 
2
 Cf. https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/explore-documents-luxembourg-leaks-database. 
3
 Cf. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/panama-papers-der-groesste-kanal-nach-panama-1.296 
9630. 
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched its 
project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in 2013. The main purpose of 
the BEPS project has been the alignment of tax systems so that the location of real 
economic activity does coincide with tax payments (OECD, 2013). Meanwhile the 
OECD has published the final reports for all of its 15 action items and the 
implementation into national tax laws is in process (OECD, 2015). However, the 
potential success of the BEPS project which focuses mostly on transfer pricing 
and enhanced transparency is still under dispute for various reasons.4 
First, the economic magnitude of BEPS is still understood only roughly as it 
is difficult to separate tax savings resulting from BEPS structures and those 
resulting from tax-favored real activities (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). By now, it 
is common knowledge that at least some firms engage intensively in BEPS. 
However, at the same time not all firms engage in tax avoidance with the same 
intensity. Weisbach (2002) has raised the until now not completely solved 
question why this so-called undersheltering puzzle exists. Further puzzling 
evidence like the robust growth in corporate tax revenues of major economies 
brings the call for further empirical research about the magnitude of BEPS as well 
as the channels used for BEPS up. Only more understanding of these will enable 
to understand how BEPS can be hindered or whether this is necessary at all 
(Dharmapala, 2014).  
While prior empirical literature finds compelling evidence that business 
structures involving an intense ownership of highly valuable intangible property 
facilitate tax avoidance (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; 
Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b), very little is known about the actual 
                                                          
4
 Cf. for example http://www.economist.com/news/business/21672207-plan-curb-multinationals-
tax -avoidance-opportunity-missed-new-rules-same-old. 
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location of certain types of intangible property. Recently, some studies have 
shown that patent ownership within MNEs is rather located at affiliates in low-tax 
countries (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and O’Connell, 2014; 
Boehm et al., 2015). Beyond this knowledge about patents, it is not known which 
other types of intangible property are used for profit shifting.  
Second, an ongoing public discussion has triggered a claim for a publicly 
disclosed country-by-country reporting of key economic indicators by MNEs 
(e.g., Tax Justice Network, 2014) while the OECD decided to enhance tax 
transparency rather towards the tax authorities instead of the general public 
(OECD, 2015). Tax authorities mostly have very limited resources and are now 
overwhelmed by information due to the OECD’s country-by-country reporting. 
Therefore, it is questioned whether this will establish enough pressure to make 
MNEs managements believe their tax structures carry too much risk (Kadet, 
2016). The supporter of a public country-by-country reporting for all MNEs 
expect a limitation of international tax avoidance, because a publicly disclosed 
country-by-country reporting might increase public pressure from customers or 
the general public. Lately, Amazon and Facebook changed the recording of their 
sales due to the high public pressure resulting from the public discussion of their 
very low ETRs. These changes will result in higher tax payments in Europe.5 
Even though these examples show that public pressure can have an influence on 
tax behavior of MNEs, empirical evidence on the effect of public disclosure of tax 
planning details on the scope of tax avoidance is still scare. 
The recent debate primarily focuses on corporate taxes. However, as a big 
party of the debate – the public – consists of potential investors, the discussion 
                                                          
5
 Cf. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35724308; http://fortune.com/2015/05/26/amazon-is-
going-to-pay-more-tax-in-europe. 
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should, consequently, also take the investor’s personal tax burden into account. 
Prior empirical literature identifies the decisive influence individual top 
executives have on a firm’s corporate tax planning (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 
2010; Graham et al., 2014) and that differences in taxation of dividends and 
capital gains is reflected in the payout policy of firms (Brav et al., 2005; Chetty 
and Saez, 2005, 2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 
2013). However, so far it is not known whether highly engaged in corporate tax 
planning comes along with a particularly high sensitivity to personal capital 
income taxes at a firm’s level. 
This thesis aims to contribute to these presented research gaps in three 
essays. The first essay “Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and 
International Tax Avoidance” is co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of 
Business Taxation at the University of Cologne and Tanja Herbert, former 
doctoral research assistant at the Chair of Business Taxation at the University of 
Cologne. We analyze the influence of public disclosure of group structures in 
Exhibit 21 on tax avoidance of U.S. MNEs. The paper was presented at the 
Doctoral Research Seminar in Berlin 2015, the 2nd Doctoral Research Seminar in 
Vienna 2015, the 38th European Accounting Association Annual Congress 2015 in 
Glasgow, the Tagung der Kommission Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre der 
VHB 2015 and the Accounting Section of the German Economic Association 
2015 (VfS). 
The second essay “Corporate Tax Planning and the Payout Ratio of Firms – 
Is the Dividend Tax Penalty Linked to ETRs?” investigates whether those firms 
being sensitive about their corporate tax burden are also sensitive about their 
shareholders’ tax payments. This paper was presented at the joint Doctoral 
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Research Seminar with FU Berlin in Cologne 2016. It is based on a working paper 
with Alexander Tassius, doctoral research assistant at the Chair of Business 
Taxation at the University of Cologne. 
The final essay “Corporate Taxes and the Location of U.S. Trademarks” is 
co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the University of 
Cologne and Jost Heckemeyer, Professor of Accounting and Taxation at the 
University of Hannover. We analyze where the ownership of U.S. trademarks is 
located and whether tax considerations play a decisive role in the decision where 
to locate the ownership. The project was presented at the ZEW Public Finance 
Conference 2016, the 39th European Accounting Association Annual Congress 
2016 in Maastricht, the Tagung der Kommission Betriebswirtschaftliche 
Steuerlehre der VHB 2016, the Forschungskolloquium 2016 at the Otto-von-
Guericke-University Magdeburg and at the 6th Conference on Current Research in 
Taxation 2016 in Bonn. 
1.2. Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and International Tax 
Avoidance 
1.2.1. Research Question and Design 
The essay “Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and International Tax 
Avoidance” analyzes the relationship between public disclosure of group 
structures in Exhibit 21 and international tax avoidance of U.S. MNEs. Several 
U.S. firms have removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 
21 since 2010 (Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). We considered Exhibit 21 as a 
simplified version of a publicly available country-by-country reporting. 
Interestingly, according to public company registries most of the subsidiaries still 
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exist after they have been removed from Exhibit 21 (Gramlich and Whiteaker-
Poe, 2013).  
A reason for the noticeable change in Exhibit 21 disclosure might be the 
growing interest in international tax avoidance and upcoming public pressure 
(Donohoe, McGill and Outslay, 2012). As executives are partially responsible for 
a firm’s tax avoidance level (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2010), we expect 
executives of those firms that become less transparent regarding the reporting of 
international firm structures in Exhibit 21 to deliberately make the decision to 
become more tax aggressive. 
Prior literature finds that less accounting transparency concerning different 
types of country-by-country reporting leads to more aggressive tax behavior 
(Hope, Ma and Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016). Hence, we 
expect that a noticeable reduction of disclosed foreign subsidiaries was followed 
by changes in the tax avoidance behavior compared to firms that did not change 
disclosure. The public discussion about aggressive tax avoidance of MNEs has 
focused primarily on strategies affecting foreign tax payments. We therefore focus 
our analysis on foreign tax avoidance measured by Foreign ETR.  
As we cannot observe one and the same firm in both scenarios – with and 
without the decision to reduce public disclosure – we apply one to five nearest 
neighbors propensity score matching (PSM) with Foreign ETR as outcome 
variable. Using the matched sample, we apply a difference-in-differences 
approach to measure the effect of the decision to become intransparent by 
comparing the change in foreign tax aggressiveness measured by Foreign ETR of 
the group that changed disclosure to the trend of the control group in the absence 
of this decision. By combining PSM with difference-in-differences estimation our 
9 
analysis is robust to the selection of observables and time-invariant unobserved 
effects (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998). 
Besides considering Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR as additional 
measures for tax avoidance, we assure that our results are neither driven by our 
matching algorithm nor by our identification of the firms deciding to become 
intransparent. Therefore, we also apply a one to one nearest neighbor matching. 
Moreover, we alter our definition for firms significantly changing their disclosure 
by considering U.S. subsidiaries and M&A activities measured by change in total 
assets.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset of U.S. listed MNEs. From 
2010 until 2014 more than 350 firms reduced the number of foreign subsidiaries 
disclosed in Exhibit 21 by more than 50 percent. The information of Exhibit 21 
derives from Dyreng’s database and the consolidated financial statement 
information is extracted from Compustat North America.  
1.2.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results of our difference-in-differences estimation after the PSM 
indicate that firms reducing transparency develop significantly different regarding 
their tax avoidance than firms that do not change behavior. We identify an 
additional decline in Foreign ETR and Foreign ETR Current by about 3 
percentage points and in GAAP ETR by about 2 percentage points. These results 
are supported by our robustness checks. Accordingly, our results confirm a 
relationship between disclosure of international firm structures and the scope of 
international tax avoidance. 
Since 2015 European credit institutions have to publish profit and tax 
payments as well as other information on a country-by-country basis. Very 
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recently, the European Commission adopted a proposal of a country-by-country 
reporting for all MNEs in Europe (European Commission, 2016). This study 
provides new insights to the related debate about the benefits of more 
transparency and more disclosure of international tax structures of MNEs. It 
contributes to a small strand of literature which analyzes the relationship between 
public disclosure and the intensity of international tax planning (Hope, Ma and 
Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016) and attends the ongoing 
discussion whether firms avoid less taxes if they perceive costs associated with 
public pressure (Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock, 2014; Jacob, Rohlfing-
Bastian and Sander, 2014).  
1.3. Corporate Tax Planning and the Payout Ratio of Firms – Is the 
Dividend Penalty Linked to ETRs? 
1.3.1. Research Question and Design 
The second essay “Corporate Tax Planning and the Payout Ratio of Firms: 
Is the Dividend Penalty Linked to ETRs?” investigates whether firms being highly 
engaged in corporate tax planning care also about their investor’s tax burden. An 
investor can either receive a dividend payment of a firm while just holding the 
stock in his portfolio around the ex-day or sell the stock one day before the ex-day 
cum dividend and rebuy it the next day when the stock trades ex dividend. In both 
scenarios, the investor receives the dividend amount in cash and finally owns the 
corresponding stock. Yet the tax rate for each scenario might differ as in the first 
case the dividend tax rate and in the second case the capital gains tax rate applies. 
Hence, we analyze whether firms being highly engaged in corporate tax planning 
do react more sensitive to an exogenous variation of the relationship between 
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personal dividend and capital gains tax rates than firms which are less engaged in 
corporate tax planning.  
Prior literature identifies that the difference in taxation of dividends and 
capital gains is reflected in the payout policy of firms (Chetty and Saez, 2005, 
2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). Moreover, a 
firm’s management on the one hand influences the amount of the firm’s corporate 
tax planning (cf. Graham et al., 2014) and on the other hand also decides about the 
amount of cash which is distributed to its shareholders via dividend payments and 
where according to Brav et al. (2005) personal shareholder taxes do play a role. 
Hence, if a firm’s management cares relatively more about its corporate taxes, we 
suggest that it is also more engaged in reducing their shareholders’ tax bills.  
The challenge of this research question is to identify the intensity of a firm’s 
tax planning activities, i.e. our dummy variable TAXPL. Prior literature 
implemented Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) as most popular measure for firms’ tax 
planning behavior (cf. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Accordingly, most of our 
definitions for TAXPL are based on the GAAP ETR and GAAP ETR Current. 
Besides accounting for the volatility of ETRs, we consider differences in tax 
planning due to industry affiliation and firm size. Moreover, we apply a pre-
regression approach that accounts for all firm characteristics that have an 
influence on ETRs, but are not associated with aggressive tax planning. Previous 
studies have confirmed that the mobility of income increases for firms with high 
intangible asset ownership or high expenses for R&D (Harris, 1993; Grubert, 
2003; De Simone, Mills and Stomberg, 2014). In a second step, we consider these 
firm characteristics to define TAXPL.    
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Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 13,106 distinct firms being 
located in 18 different countries (G7 merged with the EU15 member states) over 
ten years with several tax rate variations. Consolidated financial statement 
information derives from Compustat North America and Compustat Global. 
Personal tax rate information is hand collected from the European Tax Handbook, 
KPMG Individual Income Tax Rate Survey, PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide 
Individual Tax Summaries and Ernst and Young Worldwide Personal Tax Guide. 
1.3.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results of our difference-in-differences estimations confirm that a firm’s 
dividend yield decreases when dividends become more heavily taxed compared to 
capital gains. However, applying a variety of definitions for tax planning affinity, 
we are not able to identify that these firms’ dividend yields react stronger to 
changes in the relationship of dividend to capital gains taxation.  
The study contributes to the existing literature by providing additional 
evidence and confirming prior literature that firms consider existing personal tax 
rates for dividends and capital gains when they choose the amount of dividends 
paid to the shareholders (Brav et al., 2005; Chetty and Saez, 2005, 2006; Brown, 
Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). Moreover, it provides 
additional tests whether this reaction is related to firm’s corporate tax planning 
affinity. While prior literature’s results indicate that a firm’s management 
influences both, corporate tax planning and the level of dividend payments (Brav 
et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2014), so far no study has analyzed whether these are 
the same. 
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1.4. Corporate Taxes and the Location of U.S. Trademarks  
1.4.1. Research Question and Design 
The final essay “Corporate Taxes and the Location of U.S. Trademarks” 
investigates whether tax incentives play a role in the legal assignment of 
trademarks registered for the U.S. market by large U.S. based multinational 
enterprises (S&P 500). Furthermore, these results are compared to the assignment 
of U.S. trademarks registered by European firms (STOXX 600 Europe). As 
important intangible assets in modern business, trademarks often represent 
fundamental drivers of firm value. They serve to convey corporate identity by 
enabling companies to distinguish their products from the competition. Investors 
acknowledge the value of trademarks (Sandner and Block, 2011) and expect 
positive cash flow effects from new registered trademarks (Krasnikov, Mishra and 
Orozco, 2009).  
MNEs may seek tax advantages in holding trademark assets offshore. 
Trademarks, just as other intangibles, exhibit characteristics of a public good 
(Markusen, 1995) and thus can be used as a non-rival input separate from other 
affiliates in the group. Appropriate royalty rates should be at arm’s length. Given 
that the valuation of intangibles is difficult, MNEs may be able to distort intra-
group royalty prices in order to shift additional income to the trademark-owner. 
Our empirical analysis is tripartite: We first analyze the determinants of the 
corporate decision to locate legal ownership of U.S. trademarks offshore (offshore 
decision). In a second step, we investigate the tax and non-tax country 
characteristics that attract legal ownership of U.S. trademarks, conditional on 
offshoring ownership (foreign location decision) for S&P 500 firms. Finally, we 
compare the foreign location decision results of U.S. firms to those of European 
14 
firms. In our first step, we apply a logit model including independent variables 
that reflect the incentive to shift income and allocate assets offshore. Our second 
and third step consists of a mixed logit model accounting for varios country 
characteristics that might influence the choice where to locate a trademark. 
The empirical analysis is based on U.S. trademark registrations of large U.S. 
(S&P 500) and large European (STOXX Europe 600) MNEs between 2003 and 
2012. The trademark information derives from the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s register whereas firm strucutre information derives from Exhibit 21 for 
U.S. firms and from Amadeus for European firms. Financial data is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. Statutory corporate tax rates, information on CFC legislation in 
the U.S. and European countries as well as special tax treatment of trademark 
income (trademark boxes) are collected from the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) and tax surveys provided by EY, KPMG and PwC. 
Macroeconomic data is obtained from the World Bank and CEPII GEODIST. 
U.S. Marginal Tax Rates derive from Graham’s database.  
1.4.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results show that there is a strong home bias in U.S. trademark 
ownership of U.S. MNEs listed in the S&P 500. Similarly, European MNEs listed 
in the STOXX Europe 600 show a strong home and U.S. bias.  
Interestingly, we do not identify tax considerations as an important factor in 
the U.S. firms’ offshore decision. However, we find a strong concentration of 
trademarks’ ownership location in Delaware which is acknowledged to be a 
domestic U.S. tax haven (Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 2013; Lindsey and 
Wilson, 2015). Accordingly, we assume that tax considerations indeed play a role 
when a firm chooses an U.S. affiliate for trademark ownership.  
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Getting to the foreign location decision of U.S. firms, the tax elasticity of 
trademark location choice is indeed significant and negative. Moreover, we find 
that withholding taxes imposed on royalty payments between the U.S. and a po-
tential trademark location significantly lower the respective country’s probability 
to actually host a U.S. trademark. Simulating a one percentage point decrease in 
the statutory tax rate of some selected countries, we identify that especially tax ha-
vens benefit from this cut in statutory tax rate. Comparing these results to the lo-
cation choice of European MNEs, we find that U.S. firms react slightly more 
sensitive to a one percentage point cut in statutory tax rate of tax haven countries. 
Prior literature shows that tax-motivated income-shifting may involve the 
tax-efficient geographical allocation of intangible assets within the group (Grubert 
and Slemrod, 1998; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 
2012b). With respect to the types of intangibles at the heart of international tax 
saving strategies, previous work mostly concentrates on the role of patents 
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and O’Connell, 2014; Boehm et al., 
2015). Dudar and Voget (2016) analyze the tax response of patent and trademark 
assignments for a pooled sample of European and U.S. firms. Still, very little is 
known about the relevance of U.S. trademarks for international tax planning of 
large MNEs, considering the particularities of the U.S. context. This paper fills 
this research gap and analyzes the extent to which international tax incentives 
drive the geographical ownership allocation of trademarks filed at the USPTO 
within large U.S. MNEs and European MNEs.  
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Abstract:  
Our study analyzes the relationship between public disclosure of group structures 
in Exhibit 21 and international tax avoidance of U.S. multinational firms. Several 
U.S. multinational enterprises have removed a substantial number of subsidiaries 
from their Exhibit 21 since 2010. Our analysis suggests that firms that decided to 
substantially reduce the number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 
21 avoid significantly more taxes compared to firms that did not change 
disclosure.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The establishment of more transparency is one of the key aspects of the 
recent debate about taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Disclosure 
about key economic figures and tax payments on a country-by-country basis 
should hinder international tax avoidance of MNEs. We analyze the relationship 
between public disclosure of group structures of U.S. MNEs in Exhibit 21 and tax 
avoidance using a noticeable change in the disclosure of foreign subsidiaries.  
The ongoing public discussion about specific MNEs avoiding taxes has 
triggered a claim for a country-by-country reporting of key economic indicators 
by MNEs (e.g., OECD, 2013; Tax Justice Network, 2014). Since 2015 European 
credit institutions have to publish profit and tax payments as well as other 
information on a country-by-country basis. Very recently, the European 
Commission adopted a proposal for a country-by-country reporting for all MNEs 
in Europe (European Commission, 2016).  
One expectation for the implementation of a publicly available country-by-
country reporting is a limitation of international tax avoidance, because it might 
increase public pressure from customers or the general public. Currently, Amazon 
serves as a prominent example where public pressure due to accounting 
transparency leads to less tax avoidance. Under the pressure of E.U. authorities 
that investigate Amazon’s tax arrangements via subsidiary locations especially in 
Luxembourg, the company has changed its financial accounting of revenues from 
sales in Europe, a step that could lead to higher tax payments.6 
However, as MNEs are currently not obliged to disclose an entire country-
by-country reporting, empirical evidence on the effect of public disclosure of tax 
                                                          
6
 http://fortune.com/2015/05/26/amazon-is-going-to-pay-more-tax-in-europe. 
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planning details on the scope of tax avoidance is still scarce. Hope, Ma and 
Thomas (2013) analyze the adoption of the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 131 in 1998 that allows firms to abstain from disclosure of 
geographic earnings. They find that opting to discontinue geographic earnings 
disclosure was associated with significantly lower ETRs. However, they also find 
that the effects vanished in 2004 when U.S. firms were required to include 
Schedule M-3 – a type of country-by-country reporting – in their tax returns. 
Hence, the firms also reacted to a change in tax disclosure that is not publicly 
available. Accordingly, the firms might rather have responded to better 
information of tax auditors than to changing reputational costs. 
We therefore refer to a recent change in public disclosure of international 
firm structures by U.S. MNEs starting in 2010. U.S. listed firms are obliged to 
disclose a simplified country-by-country reporting that consists of a list of their 
significant subsidiaries and their country of incorporation in Exhibit 21 of Form 
10-k to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Since 2010 several 
companies removed a substantial number of foreign subsidiaries from their 
Exhibit 21. For example, Oracle disclosed more than 400 significant subsidiaries 
for the fiscal year 2010, whereas in 2011 this number declined to six significant 
subsidiaries, of which only three are based in foreign countries.7 As Oracle’s 10-k 
filings mention an extensive expansion and acquisition program and do not reveal 
any explanation for this extensive reduction, there is no obvious reason for this 
phenomenon despite the option in the SEC regulation to omit non-significant 
subsidiaries. For two firms of the firms that substantially changed their disclosure 
in Exhibit 21, Google and Oracle, Gramlich and Whiteaker-Poe (2013) detect that 
                                                          
7The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary – From Google to FedEx, Wall Street Journal, 5/22/2013; 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323463704578497290099032374.  
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at least 65 percent of the disappearing subsidiaries still existed in 2012 after they 
substantially reduced their number of subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21.  
A reason for the noticeable change in Exhibit 21 disclosure might be the 
growing interest in international tax avoidance and upcoming public pressure 
(Donohoe, McGill and Outslay, 2012). Oracle, for example, reported an effective 
tax rate (ETR) on foreign income of 18.9 percent in 2010, the year before the 
number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in its Exhibit 21 fell from 454 to 3. In 
2011, Oracle reported an ETR on foreign income of only 12.45 percent, a 
reduction by 6 percentage points.  
We use this phenomenon of intransparency regarding foreign subsidiaries 
reported in Exhibit 21 to test whether the noticeable reduction of disclosed 
information was followed by changes in the tax avoidance behavior. Our 
empirical design using a change in the disclosure of firm structures relates to a 
recent study by Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2016). Using a sample of MNEs in 
the United Kingdom, they analyze how tax avoidance was affected by a force to 
disclose all foreign subsidiaries. They find increasing ETRs for U.K. firms after 
they had to reveal a complete list of their foreign subsidiaries.  
Our focus however is on U.S. MNEs that reduce the number of foreign 
subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21. From 2010 until 2014 more than 250 U.S. 
listed firms reduced the number of foreign subsidiaries by more than 50 percent. 
An explorative analysis reveals that the vanishing foreign subsidiaries are not 
concentrated in certain host countries. In particular, foreign subsidiaries from tax 
haven countries and other countries have been removed from Exhibit 21 in a 
similar manner.  
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In our empirical analysis, we use propensity-score matching (PSM) to 
carefully compare the tax avoidance behavior of MNEs that substantially reduced 
their disclosure of foreign subsidiaries with similar MNEs that do not. In 
particular, we consider a variety of well-known determinants of tax avoidance 
when computing the propensity scores. Using difference-in-differences 
estimations, our matched sample analysis shows that MNEs changing their 
disclosure develop significantly different regarding their tax avoidance compared 
to MNEs that did not. Our results suggest an additional decline in Foreign ETR 
and Foreign ETR Current by about 3 percentage points and in the GAAP ETR by 
about 2 percentage points, if a firm has noticeably reduced the disclosure of 
foreign subsidiaries. The effect of a change in public disclosure on international 
tax avoidance is robust across several specifications and different measures of 
international tax avoidance. As most of the firms referred to M&A activities as the 
main reason for their changes in disclosure, we also control for M&A activities in 
additional analysis.  
We contribute to the recent debate about the benefits of more transparency 
and more disclosure of international tax structures of MNEs. While the OECD 
decided to enhance tax transparency rather towards the tax authorities instead of 
the general public (OECD, 2015), supporters claim for a publicly disclosed 
country-by-country reporting (e.g., Tax Justice Network, 2014) or even for public 
disclosure of tax returns (Lenter, Shackelford and Slemrod, 2003). Our results 
suggest that firms that decided to become intransparent regarding their 
international firm structures disclosed in Exhibit 21 develop significantly different 
regarding their tax avoidance behavior compared to firms that did not change 
disclosure. Accordingly, our results confirm a relationship between disclosure of 
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international firm structures and the scope of international tax avoidance and 
hence support the arguments in favor of a publicly available country-by-country 
reporting as recently proposed by the European Commission (2016).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we 
discuss the impact of public disclosure on international tax avoidance. Section 2.3 
describes our propensity score matching. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2. Public Disclosure and International Tax Avoidance 
MNEs benefit from additional tax planning opportunities as profits can be 
shifted to subsidiaries subject to low tax rates. Previous studies have found that 
reported profits of foreign subsidiaries are inversely related to the local tax level, 
suggesting intra-firm shifting of taxable profits (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga 
and Laeven, 2008; Klassen and LaPlante, 2012a, 2012b; Blouin, Robinson and 
Seidman, 2015). MNEs exploit international tax rate differentials by means of 
transfer pricing for intra-firm sales (Clausing, 2003) and allocation of valuable 
patents to low-tax subsidiaries to facilitate profit shifting by charging intra-firm 
royalties (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and O’Connell, 2014). 
Moreover, MNEs establish subsidiaries in tax haven countries (Desai, Foley and 
Hines, 2006)8 and benefit from different definitions of residence. In particular, 
structures including subsidiaries in Ireland benefit from the different definitions of 
residence under U.S. and Irish tax law (Ting, 2014). Therefore, studies by Dyreng 
and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012a, 2012b) consider tax 
                                                          
8
 Subpart F of the IRC should prevent U.S. based firms from using subsidiaries in tax havens. 
However, U.S. firms can opt to disregard entities in their U.S. tax returns (‘check the box’) to 
avoid the consequences of Subpart F. 
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haven operations and proxies for profit-shifting channels as determinants of ETR 
measures.  
Even though it is well known that MNEs engage in all types of tax 
avoidance (for an overview Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), empirical evidence also 
shows that some firms use aggressive tax planning strategies while others do not 
(Weisbach, 2002; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). An engagement in tax 
avoiding strategies is not only associated with paying less taxes, but also with 
costs and risks. Different costs and tax risks can explain differences in tax 
avoidance between firms. Tax avoidance is limited by direct costs of tax planning 
and tax advisors as well as by substitution effects due to limited management 
capacity (Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian and Sandner, 2014). Prior literature also shows 
that lower ETRs result in significantly higher tax uncertainty (Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew, 2014). Moreover, engagement in tax avoiding strategies or tax shelter 
schemes results in the risk of being detected or suffering bad reputation for the 
firm and its top management. These reputational costs cause the link between 
public disclosure and tax avoidance.  
Reputational costs crucially depend on the information available for the 
assessment of a firm’s tax strategy by shareholders, customers or the general 
public. While information requests of fiscal authorities might be satisfied by 
reporting requirements that are exclusively submitted to tax authorities, a rating of 
the scope of tax avoidance by customers or the general public requires publicly 
available information. If transparency about the international firm structure or tax 
planning strategies is reduced, customers can no longer observe the details of the 
tax strategy used. Non-tax literature finds evidence that poor transparency is often 
associated with costs for firms. For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show 
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that the cost of capital decreases when the level of disclosure increases. Biddle 
and Hilary (2006) show that an increase in accounting quality involves an increase 
in investment efficiency. If however a firm uses aggressive tax planning strategies 
and fears reputational effects, the firm should benefit from less transparency due 
to the decreasing risk of being detected or suffering bad reputation. Therefore, 
managers should be less tax aggressive, if they perceive significant reputational 
costs associated with public disclosure regulations revealing their tax avoidance 
strategies. While prior literature finds only ambiguous evidence for the magnitude 
of reputational costs (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore, Maydew and 
Thornock, 2014), a recent survey among tax executives of U.S. firms confirms 
manager concerns of reputational costs are associated with corporate tax planning 
(Graham et al., 2014).  
The recent debate about tax transparency of MNEs refers to the 
aforementioned mechanism to limit international tax avoidance. In April 2016, the 
European Commission has adopted a proposal of a country-by-country reporting 
of profits and tax payments as well as additional key economic information. 
However, the benefit of additional information to assess international tax 
avoidance is arguable. In particular, MNEs are already obliged to disclose 
information about their tax position in their financial accounts. This information 
allows computing ETR measures and evaluating tax avoidance of each MNE.  
For example, tax strategies have an impact on the firm structure of U.S. 
MNEs (Lewellen and Robinson, 2013) and tax shelter is positively related to the 
use of tax haven subsidiaries (Lisowsky, 2010). Therefore, information about 
subsidiaries located in tax haven countries is often perceived as evidence for an 
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aggressive tax avoidance strategy. If this information is publicly available, firms 
might engage less in tax haven subsidiaries due to public pressure they anticipate.  
Previous literature suggests that disclosure of additional information about 
the international firm structure influences the scope of international tax avoidance. 
Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) find significantly lower ETR measures for firms 
that abstain from disclosure of geographic earnings in their financial reports after 
the adoption of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 in 1998. 
However, they also find that the effects vanished in 2004 when U.S. firms were 
required to include Schedule M-3 – a type of country-by-country reporting – in 
their tax returns. Since Schedule M-3 is not publicly available, this latter finding 
suggests that firms responded rather to a changing detection risk in tax audits than 
to changing reputational costs. 
Recently, Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2016) analyze public pressure on 
MNEs in the United Kingdom to carefully report a complete list of all foreign 
subsidiaries. While several U.K. firms had used to disclose only part of their 
foreign subsidiaries in former years, upcoming public pressure forced U.K. firms 
to reveal a complete list of their foreign subsidiaries. The study reveals increasing 
ETRs for U.K. firms after they had to reveal their list of foreign subsidiaries. 
We also consider changes in the disclosure of information about foreign 
subsidiaries, but unlike Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2016) we focus on U.S. 
MNEs. We consider the list of foreign subsidiaries provided in Exhibit 21. Exhibit 
21 is part of Form 10-k, which U.S. listed firms are obliged to submit to the SEC 
for each fiscal year. According to the disclosure rule 601 of SEC Regulation S-K 
(§229.601), they must provide a list of all significant subsidiaries and their 
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countries of incorporation. Accordingly, the disclosed information allows a rough 
understanding of a firm’s international group structure.  
Interestingly, it can be observed that starting in 2010 several MNEs have 
removed a substantial number of foreign subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 
(Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). There is no obvious reason for the decrease in 
subsidiaries despite an option in the disclosure rule to omit certain subsidiaries 
and the respective firm’s decision to opt for a lower level of transparency 
concerning their international activities.9  A reason for the noticeable change in 
Exhibit 21 disclosure might be the growing interest in international tax avoidance 
and upcoming public pressure (Donohoe, McGill and Outslay, 2012). Since 
international tax avoidance is often associated with certain international firm 
structures, the information from Exhibit 21 has been used to investigate the 
impact of tax haven activities on tax avoidance (e.g., United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2008; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Lindsey and Wilson, 
2015). Less disclosure of international firm structures can avoid such assessments 
and negative media coverage. As a consequence, those firms, that decided to 
substantially reduce the information provided by their Exhibit 21, are subject to 
less restriction and might have started to use more enhanced international 
structures to avoid additional taxes. As executives are partially responsible for a 
firm’s tax avoidance level (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2010), we expect 
executives of firms which become intransparent to deliberately make the decision 
to become more tax aggressive.  
The public discussion about intense tax avoidance of MNEs has focused 
primarily on strategies affecting foreign tax payments. For example, the 
                                                          
9
 While the SEC’s definition gives the option to omit certain subsidiaries and the disclosure might 
be difficult to enforce by the SEC, the potential penalty for failure to file information is only 
$100 per day (15 U.S.C. §78ff), or $36,500 per year. 
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coffeehouse chain Starbucks paid only £8.6 million in U.K. corporate taxes on 
sales of £3 billion from 1998 to 2012. Nevertheless, Starbucks’ top-level 
management stressed that the company’s tax rate was 32 percent on U.S. profits. 
We therefore focus our analysis on foreign tax avoidance. In particular, we 
investigate whether a reduction of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 of 
Form 10-k is associated with additional international tax avoidance measured by 
Foreign ETR.   
2.3. Empirical Design 
2.3.1. Intransparency regarding Subsidiaries Reported 
Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k consists of a list of a firm’s worldwide subsidiaries 
and their countries of incorporation. Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601) 
requires, however, only the disclosure of significant subsidiaries. A subsidiary is 
deemed to be insignificant if three materiality conditions are fulfilled.10 Moreover, 
under certain conditions wholly-owned subsidiaries carrying on the same line of 
business may be omitted as well. 11  Even though the disclosure rule was not 
changed during our research period, a substantial number of subsidiaries vanished 
from some Exhibit 21 disclosures in this space of time. Therefore, we assume that 
this reduction in transparency derives from an option in Item 601 of SEC 
Regulation S-K (§229.601) which allows to omit non-significant subsidiaries and 
                                                          
10
 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), a subsidiary can be deemed not to be a 
significant subsidiary if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the parent company’s 
and its other subsidiaries’ investments in the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent of the parent 
company’s total assets; (2) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share 
of the assets of the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent of the consolidated firm’s total assets; 
and (3) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the subsidiary’s 
pre-tax income from continuing operations does not exceed ten percent of the consolidated 
income from continuing operations. 
11
 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 229.601-(b)(21)(ii)), names of subsidiaries being 
consolidated wholly-owned multiple subsidiaries and carrying on the same line of business (such 
as chain stores and small loan companies) may be omitted if the name of the immediate parent, 
the line of business and the number of omitted subsidiaries divided by subsidiaries operating in 
the U.S. and subsidiaries operating in foreign countries is provided. 
33 
wholly-owned subsidiaries carrying on the same line of business. Prior literature 
considers Exhibit 21 as a reliable source for the geographic location of MNEs’ 
subsidiaries until 2009 (Donohoe, McGill and Outslay, 2012; Lindsey and 
Wilson, 2015). Accordingly, we consider Exhibit 21 disclosures of various U.S. 
MNEs in a time period between 2009 and 2014 and compare these on a year by 
year basis to identify firms that have substantially reduced their list of foreign 
subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 suddenly.12  
We assume a noticeable decline in significant subsidiaries, if the number of 
foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21 declines by more than 50 percent 
compared to the previous fiscal year. We however consider a firm only as 
substantially changing its disclosure, if at least 10 significant foreign subsidiaries 
vanished from its Exhibit 21. Moreover, we reclassify a firm as not substantially 
changing its disclosure, if the firm does not fulfil our definition in the subsequent 
year anymore. Thus, we guarantee that the change in Exhibit 21 is not only a 
temporary phenomenon. In the following, we refer to this phenomenon as change 
disclosure. Thus, change year refers to the year in which this definition is fulfilled 
and pre-change year to the year before. All other firms that do not noticeable 
change their disclosure are considered as control firms. 
In our main definition we do not consider the U.S. subsidiaries disclosed in 
Exhibit 21, as we analyze the influence of public disclosure on international tax 
avoidance. However, in additional analysis we also check the robustness of our 
results for the consideration of U.S. subsidiaries.  
To further investigate disclosure behavior, we contacted the investor 
relations departments of some of those firms that substantially changed the 
                                                          
12
 The analyzed period ends in 2014 as this is the last year that is included in Dyreng‘s database. 
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number of significant foreign subsidiaries reported. We asked them via letters and 
email about the reasons for their decreasing number of foreign subsidiaries 
disclosed in Exhibit 21. Only very few firms responded to our request. We 
interpret this fact as an indication of their rather reluctant behavior concerning the 
supply of publicly available company information. For those firms that responded 
to our request, tax planning was not of particular importance. The firms refer to 
M&A activities as the main reason for their changes in disclosure. If we attempt to 
verify this explanation, we are unable to retrace all of the vanishing foreign 
subsidiaries as being related to the respective restructuring process. Because 
restructuring partly might be a reason in some cases, we however account for 
changes in Exhibit 21 due to M&A activities. We assume that a firm’s total assets 
should noticeable decline, if and when it sells parts of its business. Accordingly, 
we treat firms as not substantially changing their disclosure, if the firm’s total 
assets also decline by more than 50 percent in additional analysis. 
Imposing our main definition on our research sample identifies 276 firms 
that noticeably reduced their public disclosure of foreign subsidiaries; among 
them Avis Budget Group Inc., Best Buy Co. Inc., Boeing Co., Coca-Cola Co., 
Emerson Electric Co., Merck & Co., Nike Inc., Oracle Corp., PepsiCo Inc. and 
Starbucks Corp. To further describe the characteristics of the 276 firms, table 1 
shows the industries as well as the years in which these firms fulfil our main 
definition. The years in which most of the firms change their disclosure are 2012 
and 2013. In these two years more than 65 percent of all cases took place. 
Referring to Fama-French industry classification, table 1 shows that the 
substantial changes in Exhibit 21 reporting is distributed across all industries.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of Firm’s that Substantially Change Disclosure 
Industry Frequency Change Year 
Number of 
Firms 
Food 12 2010 12 
Mining & Minerals 1 2011 64 
Oil & Petroleum Products 9 2012 98 
Textiles, Apparel & Footwear 11 2013 84 
Consumer Durables 5 2014 18 
Chemicals 13 
  
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 11 
  
Construction & Construction Materials 6 
  
Steel Works 3 
  
Fabricated Products 5 
  
Machinery & Business Equipment 70 
  
Automobiles 7 
  
Transportation 10 
  
Utilities 1 
  
Retail Stores 8 
  
Banks, Insurance Companies & Other 
Financials 11 
  
Other 93 
  
Total 276 Total  276 
Notes: Table 1 gives an overview on the firms that substantially change disclosure of foreign subsidiaries 
listed in Exhibit 21 as it summarizes the industry and the year in which the firms changes its disclosure. The 
industry classification is based on Fama and French. 
Those 276 firms that have changed their disclosure of foreign subsidiaries 
listed in Exhibit 21 reported on average subsidiaries in 27.9 distinct countries in 
the last year before the disclosure change. In the year of disclosure change, this 
number declines to 15.3 countries. This means that on average 12.6 countries 
vanish from each firm’s Exhibit 21. We used the Exhibit 21 disclosures to identify 
the top 20 countries in which most firms with a changing Exhibit 21 disclosure 
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reported at least one subsidiary in the last year before they change their disclosure 
to less transparency and in the year of the change in disclosure. Table 2 provides 
the respective lists of countries disclosed in Exhibit 21. Information about 
subsidiaries located in tax haven countries is often perceived as evidence for an 
aggressive tax avoidance strategy (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Balakrishnan, 
Blouin and Guay, 2012; Donohoe, McGill and Outslay, 2012). However, tax 
haven countries and other countries vanish in a similar manner, i.e. the firms that 
change disclosure rather decide to reduce transparency overall and not only for 
particular countries. 
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Table 2: Vanishing Countries 
Country Pre-Change Year  Country 
Change  
Year 
Great Britain 270 
 
Canada 218 
Canada 257 
 
Australia 154 
Germany 237 
 
India 152 
China 234 
 
Mexico 147 
Netherlands 232 
 
Japan 144 
France 226 
 
France 138 
Hong-Kong* 208 
 
Hong-Kong* 125 
Mexico 207 
 
China 117 
Australia 205 
 
Singapore* 116 
Japan 203 
 
Rep. of Korea 112 
Singapore* 197 
 
Netherlands 105 
India 190 
 
Ireland* 99 
Italy 190 
 
Luxemburg* 82 
Brazil 185 
 
Thailand 82 
Spain 177 
 
Malaysia 75 
Rep. of Korea 169 
 
Argentina 73 
Switzerland* 164 
 
Belgium 72 
Ireland* 151 
 
Germany 71 
Sweden 142 
 
Chile 69 
Belgium 140 
 
Switzerland* 68 
Notes: Table 2 presents the top 20 countries in which the firms that substantially changed disclosure of 
foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 reported at least one subsidiary in their Exhibit 21. Pre-Change Year 
(Change Year) refers to the number of firms that reported at least one subsidiary in the respective country 
according to their Exhibit 21 in the year prior to the decision to noticeably change disclosure (the change 
year). Countries marked with a * are tax havens following Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) definition. 
2.3.2. Sample Selection 
We use two distinct sources: financial statement information from 
Compustat North America and subsidiary information disclosed in Exhibit 21 of 
Form 10-k. Our starting point for data sampling is the Exhibit 21 dataset provided 
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by Scott Dyreng.13 We use these data for the fiscal years 2009 through 2014. 
According to our definition a firm has to eliminate more than 10 subsidiaries to be 
considered as firm that has substantially changed disclosure in Exhibit 21. 
Consequently, we do not consider observations of firms reporting 10 or less 
foreign subsidiaries in our control group.  
In a next step, we add the financial statement data from Compustat for the 
fiscal years 2009 till 2014. The two datasets are combined by CIK number. As we 
analyze the tax planning behavior of U.S. MNEs, we limit our sample to firms 
disclosing their financial statements in U.S. dollars and having their headquarters 
located in the U.S. Moreover, we require the firms to report subsidiaries in at least 
one foreign country.  
Financial statement information is used to compute the tax avoidance 
measures and most of the variables used for the determination of our propensity 
scores. Our analysis focuses on Foreign ETR as a tax measure. Hence, we require 
non-missing values for foreign pre-tax income (pifo) and foreign income taxes 
(txfo and txdfo). As it is difficult to analyze our results concerning the tax planning 
activities of unprofitable companies in the respective period, we restrict the 
sample to firms having a positive pre-tax income (pi) and a positive pre-tax 
foreign income (pifo).  
We derive a final sample consisting of 878 companies of which 276 decide 
to reduce their transparency concerning the reporting of foreign subsidiaries in 
Exhibit 21 between 2010 and 2014. For the treatment period (2010-2014), our 
final sample consists of 2,477 firm-year observations. 1,635 of these belong to 
control firms. The remaining 842 firm-year observations pertain to those firms 
                                                          
13
 We thank Scott D. Dyreng for offering his Exhibit 21 dataset for download on 
https://spreadsheets.google.com/viewform?formkey=dElURjI1eUJvWDhHSmMwMmFPVmdv
Vnc6MQ. Further description of the dataset can be found in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).  
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that substantially reduce the number of subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21. 469 of 
these firm-year observations refer to years prior to the change year whereas 373 
refer to the post-change period. 
2.3.3 Explorative Analysis 
We expect that firms reduce transparency in order to engage in further tax 
avoidance. ETRs are well-accepted measures for tax avoidance of MNEs (cf. for 
example Plesko 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008), as a lower ETR 
suggests that a firm is more effectively avoiding income taxes compared to firms 
with higher ETR measures. Since we are mainly interested in international tax 
avoidance, we focus our analysis on a firm’s Foreign ETR as Tax Measure. 
However, to show the robustness of our results we also consider Foreign ETR 
Current and GAAP ETR.14  
To get a first insight into the corporate tax planning of firms before and after 
they substantially reduced the number of foreign subsidiaries reported in their 
Exhibit 21, we provide an explorative analysis of our data. Table 3 compares the 
ETR measures und provides simple t-test results.  
                                                          
14
 To limit the influence of outliers, we delete ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1. Variables are described in 
the appendix. 
40 
Table 3: T-tests before Matching 
  pre-change period post-change period 
  Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Foreign ETR 0.252 0.247 0.004 0.233 0.247 -0.014** 
  
  
(0.008) 
  
(0.008) 
Foreign ETR Current 0.273 0.267 0.006 0.252 0.267 -0.014* 
  
  
(0.008) 
  
(0.009) 
GAAP ETR 0.283 0.290 -0.007 0.277 0.290 -0.013** 
  
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.007) 
Notes: Table 3 presents results of several t-tests that are applied to test whether ETR measures of firms that 
change disclosure in Exhibit 21 (change firms) are lower compared to control firms’ ETRs. The left column 
(“pre-change period”) compares mean Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR of our change 
firms prior to the change to the respective mean measure of our control firms whereas in the right column 
(“post-change period”) years from the change year onwards are considered for the change firms. For the 
control firms the ETR measures are considered for our full sample period (2010-2014) in both columns. For 
Foreign ETR, results are based on 1,635 observations for our control firms, 469 pre-change and 373 post-
change observations for our change firms. The Foreign ETR Current row includes 1,614, 463 and 368 
observations whereas the GAAP ETR column includes 1,529, 433 and 346 observations. The Variables are 
defined in the appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.   
In the left column we consider the respective ETR measure for those firms 
that reduce disclosure in Exhibit 21 prior to the change year whereas we consider 
the years from the change year onwards for these firms in the right column. We 
compare both – the average ETR measure of pre-change period and the average 
ETR measure of post-change period – with the respective ETR measure of firms 
that have not changed their disclosure attitude. For our main variable of interest, 
Foreign ETR, the results are based on 1,635 control group, 469 pre-treatment and 
373 post-treatment firm-year observations. The left column of table 3 shows that 
those firms that change disclosure do not differ significantly from our control 
firms concerning foreign tax avoidance measured by Foreign ETR prior to the 
decision to become less transparent regarding the international firm structure 
reported in Exhibit 21. In contrast, these firms face a significantly lower foreign 
tax burden compared to our control firms afterwards. They have, significant at the 
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5 percent level, a 1.4 percentage point lower Foreign ETR in the periods after they 
decided to reduce transparency.  
These results hold, if we consider our additional measures of tax avoidance. 
For both, Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR, table 3 depicts those firms that 
shorten the list of foreign subsidiaries do not differ significantly from our control 
firms prior to the decision to become intransparent while they do differ 
afterwards. In the post-change period, our changing firms have on average a 1.4 
percentage point lower Foreign ETR Current and a 1.3 percentage point lower 
GAAP ETR compared to our control firms.  
Taking the results for all ETR measures presented in table 3 together, those 
firms that reduced transparency about their firm structure cannot be distinguished 
from other firms by their tax planning attitude prior to the decision to noticeably 
change their disclosure in Exhibit 21. Together with reducing transparency 
concerning their international firm structure, these firms extend their tax planning 
activities and hence have significantly lower ETR measures than other firms.  
2.3.4. Propensity Score Matching 
Even though the results presented in table 3 already indicate that the 276 
identified firms become more tax aggressive in the aftermath of the decision to 
become less transparent regarding their international firm structure, these results 
have some limitations. First, it is not possible to compare the trend in the tax 
avoidance measures of these firms in the post-change period to similar control 
firms in the same period as we cannot observe pre- and post-change periods for 
our control firms. Second, the change in corporate tax planning behavior of these 
firms compared to control firms might be attributed to other confounding 
determinants. Third, MNEs might have reduced the number of subsidiaries 
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disclosed in their Exhibit 21, because they were already tax aggressive with regard 
to their foreign activities. 
The optimal setting to solve these problems would be to observe and 
compare the development of tax planning behavior for the same firm in two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the firm decides to substantially reduce the number 
of foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21 and in the second scenario the same 
firm does not use this option. As this is not possible, the best alternative is to 
identify firms of our control group that are as similar as possible regarding their 
tax avoidance opportunities and attitude prior to the change for each firm that 
decides to shorten the list of foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21. In this 
case, we can assume that the change in our ETR measures would be the same for 
both groups in the absence of the decision to become intransparent. Therefore, we 
use propensity score matching (PSM) to corroborate these problems. We identify 
partners for each firm that noticeably changes its Exhibit 21 reporting that are 
similar regarding the determinants of international tax planning in the year prior to 
this decision. 
One concern with an analysis of tax avoidance behavior is the potential 
endogeneity of a firm’s status. Admittedly, the MNE’s existing tax avoidance 
strategy might as well influence the decision to reduce the information provided in 
Exhibit 21. PSM is a feasible technique to address the potential bias caused by 
selection on observables (Titus, 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).15 It solves 
the potential endogeneity problem by selecting a control group (firms without a 
                                                          
15
 The self-selection bias has been discussed extensively in prior research (e.g. Tucker, 2010). 
Many studies implement an instrumental variable or apply the two-step Heckman procedure 
using Inverse Mill’s Ratio (Dwenger and Steiner, 2012; Badertscher, Katz, and Rego, 2013). 
Basically, both methods require an instrument, which explains the potentially endogenous 
variable, but has no effect on the dependent variable. In most cases it is difficult to have a 
consistent estimator, i.e. a variable that neither correlates with the outcome nor with any 
unobservables (Heckman, 1997; Blundell and Dias, 2000; Heckman and Li, 2004). Therefore, 
the need for a consistent instrument is a major limitation for this approach. 
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change in disclosure) that is as similar to the treatment group (firms that reduce 
information in Exhibit 21) as possible prior to the disclosure change. As control 
and treatment firms do not differ significantly concerning their tax planning 
attributes prior to the treatment, we can isolate the development of foreign tax 
aggressiveness post-treatment. The only difference between the groups lies in the 
decision to substantially reduce the number of subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21 
disclosure or not. Since the assumption is to have two equally tax aggressive 
groups, the results show the effect of a public disclosure change on tax avoidance.  
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), identifying control and 
treatment firms requires a two-step approach: In a first step, a probit model 
including a vector of all relevant pre-treatment observables Xi is used to compute 
the probability to be in the treatment group (propensity score). In a second step, 
these propensity scores are used to identify one or more control firms for each 
treated firm that are sufficient similar with respect to the pre-treatment 
observables Xi.  
Concerning the first step, it is important to choose the relevant pre-
treatment, in our case pre-changing Exhibit 21, observables driving the self-
selection bias. Only variables that influence both, treatment decision – the 
decision to reduce transparency in Exhibit 21 – and outcome variable – the 
Foreign ETR – should be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Augurzky and 
Schmidt, 2001).  
Therefore, we consider a variety of well-known determinants of the ETR 
that have been used in prior research. Prior literature developed tax avoidance 
determinants in terms of more general firm characteristics and particular variables 
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that reflect certain international tax planning strategies. We include both set of 
variables to determine our propensity score.  
The variables used are the following: We consider SIZE as a control for the 
impact of general tax planning determinants (Zimmermann, 1983; Wang, 1991; 
Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003; Chen et al., 2010). PROFITABILITY is included to 
capture that more profitable firms have more opportunities and incentives to 
reduce tax expenses by engaging in tax avoidance (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003; Chen et al., 2010). As a high level of property, plant 
and equipment causes a tax reduction due to the deductibility of high 
depreciations (Gupta and Newberry, 1997) and might also indicate less mobility 
of taxable income regarding international tax planning strategies, we consider the 
variable capital intensity (CAPINT). Firms with a high level of debt can use the 
deductibility of interest expenses to reduce their tax burden (Plesko, 2003; Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Markle and Shackelford, 2012b). The 
variable LEV captures this. As the utilization of prior operating tax loss 
carryforwards should reduce current period tax payments (Mackie, 1999; Cooper 
and Knittel, 2010), we include the dummy variable NOL that captures decreases in 
tax loss carry forwards.16 Previous studies have confirmed that the mobility of 
income increases, if a firm has many intangible assets or high expenses for R&D 
or advertising (Harris, 1993; Grubert, 2003). Hence, we include the variable R&D. 
Intense usage of tax haven countries for the location of affiliates is associated with 
more intense tax avoidance (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Balakrishnan, Blouin and 
Guay, 2012; Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). Following the tax haven countries’ 
                                                          
16
 Note that we have replaced missing values for tlcf in Compustat with the value zero, expecting 
that these firms do not have any tax loss carryforwards in the respective period. 
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definition of Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), we include HAVEN to capture the effect 
of tax haven subsidiaries. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
Using these observable characteristics, we compute the propensity score in 
accordance with Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998). Matching in the year 
before disclosure was changed, we require all firms to have a non-missing 
Foreign ETR in the year of the disclosure change and the year before as these 
values are required for our difference-in-differences approach. 17  
In the second step, the propensity scores are used to match the treatment 
firms with the control firms using a one to five nearest neighbor algorithm (with 
replacement). It is required to define the limit of deviation between the propensity 
score of treated and matched control firms, i.e. the maximum caliper. Prior 
literature identifies that higher calipers of 0.02 or 0.03 perform superior. 
Moreover, 20 percent of the standard deviation of the propensity score is seen as 
the optimal caliper (Austin, 2011; Lunt, 2014). In our case, these rules lead to the 
optimal caliper of 0.0218. Tax avoidance opportunities differ across industries due 
to the different business models (Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay, 2012). 
Therefore, we ensure that only observations from the same year and industry are 
matched. We consider the Fama and French classification of 17 different industry 
groups.19 In comparison to one to one nearest neighbor matching, one to five 
nearest neighbors matching is more reliable as it reduces the variability of the 
nearest neighbor estimator (Blundell and Dias, 2008). However, to ensure that the 
                                                          
17
 We require companies to have non-missing values for all components of the dependent and 
independent variables in the matching year. However, visual inspection of several Form 10-k 
filings reveals that many of the missing values, especially for R&D expenses, in Compustat 
should be coded as zero. Therefore, we set missing values of the variable R&D to zero. 
Additionally, we exclude observations with implausible values as LEV > 1 and CAPINT > 1 from 
our sample. 
18
 The average probability to participate in the group that substantially changes disclosure in 
Exhibit 21 for all firms is 0.32. The standard deviation is 0.12.  
19
 Updated industry-classification can be downloaded from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages 
/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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matching results are not driven by the algorithm, we also apply one to one nearest 
neighbor matching (with replacement). 
Propensity score matching selects the control group by observable variables 
only. Hence, our results might be negatively influenced by omitted variables. We 
therefore combine propensity score matching with a difference-in-differences 
approach that accounts for time-invariant unobservables (Heckman et al., 1998; 
Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). The propensity score matching creates two 
groups that are primarily similar in their tax planning attitude and do only differ in 
their decision to become less transparent regarding the reporting of international 
firm structures in Exhibit 21 and their post-development. In other words, in the 
absence of the decision to change disclosure both groups should not differ in the 
change year either. Using these two groups, we estimate the effect of this decision 
on our ETR measures by using difference-in-differences. 
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Main Findings 
In accordance with prior literature, we consider Exhibit 21 as a reliable 
source for the geographic location of MNEs’ subsidiaries until 2009. Hence, in 
our sample the treatment, i.e. the decision to noticeably change disclosure in 
Exhibit 21, can take place between 2010 and 2014. As we match in the fiscal year 
before the firms change their disclosure (pre-change year), we consider fiscal 
years between 2009 and 2013 in our probit regression and predict the propensity 
scores for these years. In a second step, we match each treatment firm to 
maximum five neighbors.  
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Table 4 depicts the results of our probit regression which indicates which 
firm characteristics determine the decision to change disclosure. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable which is defined as one for those firms that 
substantially reduce their disclosure of foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 
according to our definition and zero otherwise. 
Table 4: Probit Regression Results 
 
  (1)  
 SIZE 0.230***  
 
  (0.020)  
 PROFITABILITY -0.805*  
 
  (0.420)  
 CAPINT -0.304**  
 
  (0.122)  
 LEV -0.016  
 
  (0.184)  
 NOL 0.016  
 
  (0.099)  
 R&D 1.657**  
 
  (0.687)  
 HAVEN -0.264  
 
  (0.173)  
 Constant -2.071***  
 
  (0.170)  
 N 2,253  
Notes: Table 4 presents the probit regression results 
used for the prediction of our propensity score. The 
Variables are defined in the appendix. *, ** and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, 
respectively. 
The results show that SIZE, PROFITABLITY, CAPINT and R&D have a 
significant influence on the decision. In line with our expectations, we find large 
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firms with low capital intensity tend rather to reduce transparency than other 
firms. High values for R&D indicate more possibilities for international tax 
avoidance. Hence, it is very interesting that these firms tend to have a significant 
higher probability to be in the treatment group. 
Following our probit regression, we compute our propensity score and use it 
to match our treatment firms to a maximum of five neighbors from our control 
group. Table 5 compares the means of all variables considered for the matching 
between treatment and control group before and after the matching. Moreover, it 
shows the standardized bias for all observable variables. 
Table 5: One to Five Nearest Neighbors Matching Quality 
 
 
Mean Bias t-test 
  Treated  Control (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 8.3614 7.7666 41.4 5.25 0.000 
  Matched 7.9533 7.9999 -3.2 -0.31 0.758 
PROFITABILITY Unmatched 0.0962 0.1072 -16.2 -1.96 0.050 
  Matched 0.0979 0.1042 -9.1 -0.77 0.441 
CAPINT Unmatched 0.3520 0.3918 -16.4 -2.02 0.044 
  Matched 0.3543 0.3612 -2.8 -0.23 0.818 
LEV Unmatched 0.2206 0.2033 10.0 1.23 0.220 
  Matched 0.2068 0.2156 -5.1 -0.41 0.681 
NOL Unmatched 0.0884 0.0901 -0.6 -0.07 0.942 
  Matched 0.0923 0.1060 -4.8 -0.37 0.713 
R&D Unmatched 0.0344 0.0293 11.8 1.51 0.131 
  Matched 0.0367 0.0348 4.3 0.32 0.747 
HAVENS Unmatched 0.1932 0.1890 3.4 0.41 0.684 
  
Matched 0.1860 0.1910 -4.0 -0.35 0.724 
Notes: Table 5 presents the relevant matching characteristics before and after the matching. The results are 
formed on one to five nearest neighbors matching in the pre-treatment period requiring a propensity score of 
less than 0.02. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
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A standardized bias of up to about 5 percent after the matching is considered 
as reasonable. Higher biases are considered as too high and indicate a lack of 
balancing (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Overall, we reached a good matching 
quality as we successfully reduced the mean bias to below five percent, i.e. 4.8 
percent. However, table 5 shows that in the case PROFITABILITY and LEV the 
bias is above 5 percent. This is not considered as a problem as the t-statistics 
indicate that the differences are still insignificant after the matching. Moreover, 
the bias is reduced in both cases. 
The difference-in-differences results for the matched sample are presented 
in table 6. The results are based on a one to five nearest neighbors (1:5 NN) 
matching algorithm with Foreign ETR as outcome variable. Our propensity score 
matching matched 130 firms that decided to substantially reduce the number of 
foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21 with 329 control firms. Hence, our 
results for Foreign ETR presented in table 6 include 260 treated and 658 control 
observations. The column “pre-change year” compares the mean values of our 
treatment groups’ ETR measures to the control group in the year prior to the 
decision to reduce transparency in Exhibit 21, i.e. the matching year whereas the 
column “change year” compares the two groups in the year the treatment firm 
decides to shorten its list of foreign subsidiaries. The last column shows the 
difference-in-differences estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms. 
50 
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Results after 1:5 Nearest Neighbors 
Matching 
1:5 NN 
pre-change year change year Diff-in-
Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Foreign ETR 0.252 0.230 0.022 0.230 0.240 -0.009 -0.031** 
  
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.016) (0.013) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.276 0.252 0.024 0.244 0.257 -0.013 -0.037** 
  
  
(0.019) 
  
(0.016) (0.017) 
GAAP ETR 0.279 0.273 0.006 0.271 0.287 -0.016 -0.022* 
  
  
(0.012) 
  
(0.013) (0.013) 
Notes: Table 6 presents difference-in-differences results after one to five nearest neighbors matching with 
Foreign ETR Current as outcome variable by showing the mean outcome of Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR 
Current and GAAP ETR for treatment and control group before and after the decision to substantially reduce 
disclosure as well as its difference. “Pre-change year” refers to the year before the decision and “change year” 
to the year in which the firm actually reduces its reporting. Results are based on 260 observations in the 
treated group and 658 in the control group for Foreign ETR, 254 and 651 for Foreign ETR Current and 239 
and 616 for GAAP ETR respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
Table 6 shows that the propensity score matching aligned treatment and 
control group regarding their tax planning behavior prior to the decision to reduce 
transparency. Hence, we do not find a significant difference between the two 
groups before the change in disclosure takes place. Moreover, the mean values of 
all our ETR measures decreased from the pre-change to the change years for our 
treatment group while the respective control groups’ measures do not decrease. 
The last column presents the difference-in-differences results. The difference-in-
differences approach relies on the assumption that in the absence of the decision 
to substantially change disclosure, the change in Foreign ETR would be the same 
for both groups. The estimator is negative and statistically significant for Foreign 
ETR. Hence, the results presented in table 6 indicate a reduction in Foreign ETR 
of about 3.1 percentage points caused by the decision to noticeably change 
disclosure in Exhibit 21.  
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Table 6 depicts similar results, if we apply Foreign ETR Current and GAAP 
ETR on our matched sample. Based on 254 treated and 651 control observations, 
we find a reduction of 3.7 percentage points in Foreign ETR Current ascribable to 
the decision to change disclosure. Regarding the GAAP ETR, we identify a 
reduction of 2.2 percentage points based on 239 treated and 616 control 
observations. 
2.4.2. Robustness Checks – Propensity Score Matching 
To assure the quality of our propensity score matching, we perform several 
robustness checks. First, we assure that our results are not driven by the matching 
algorithm. Hence, we apply a one to one nearest neighbor algorithm (with 
replacement) with Foreign ETR as outcome variable. Applying this matching 
procedure, we reach an acceptable matching quality (mean bias of 5.1 percent). 
The results based 260 treated and 228 control observations are shown in table 7.  
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Results after 1:1 Nearest Neighbor 
Matching 
1:1 NN 
pre-change year change year Diff-in-
Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Foreign ETR 0.252 0.227 0.025 0.230 0.244 -0.014 -0.038** 
  
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.018) (0.017) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.276 0.244 0.032 0.244 0.262 -0.019 -0.051** 
  
  
(0.020) 
  
(0.019) (0.021) 
GAAP ETR 0.279 0.264 0.015 0.271 0.289 -0.018 -0.034** 
  
  
(0.016) 
  
(0.015) (0.016) 
Notes: Table 7 presents diff-in-diff results after one to one nearest neighbor matching with Foreign ETR 
Current as outcome variable by showing the mean of Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR for 
treatment and control group before and after the decision to change disclosure as well as its difference. “Pre-
change year” refers to the year before the decision and “change year” to the year in which the firm reduces its 
reporting. Results are based on 260 observations in the treated group and 228 in the control group for Foreign 
ETR, 254 and 226 for Foreign ETR Current and 239 and 213 for GAAP ETR respectively. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % 
and 1 %, respectively. 
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The results presented in table 7 are similar to those of the one to five nearest 
neighbors matching. Once again, we find a negative and statistically significant 
difference-in-differences estimator for all tax avoidance measures while the two 
groups do not differ significantly in the pre-change year. For Foreign ETR we 
identify a at the 5 percent level significant reduction of 3.8 percentage points 
resulting from the decision to reduce transparency. This result is very similar to 
the 3.1 percentage points we identified in the difference-in-differences estimations 
of table 6. Similar, we do find a negative and statistically significant effect for the 
difference-in-differences estimators of Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR. 
Hence, we assume that our results are not driven by the matching algorithm.  
To assure that the effect identified in section 2.4.1 is not just a temporary 
effect arising in the treatment period, we consider the pre-change year and the 
previous year as “pre-change period” and the change year and the year afterwards 
as “post-change period”. Table 8 presents the results. 
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Table 8: Enlarging Pre- and Post-Change Period: Difference-in-Differences 
Results after 1:5 Nearest Neighbors Matching 
1:5 NN 
pre-change period post-change period Diff-in-
Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Foreign ETR 0.250 0.231 0.019 0.232 0.238 -0.006 -0.024* 
  
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.015) (0.013) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.270 0.249 0.021 0.248 0.256 -0.009 -0.029** 
  
  
(0.016) 
  
(0.015) (0.015) 
GAAP ETR 0.285 0.274 0.010 0.279 0.287 -0.008 -0.018* 
  
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Notes: Table 8 presents difference-in-differences results after one to five nearest neighbors matching with 
Foreign ETR Current as outcome variable by showing the mean outcome of Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR 
Current and GAAP ETR for treatment and control group before and after the decision to substantially reduce 
disclosure as well as its difference. “Pre-change period” refers to the period including two years prior to the 
change year and “post-change period” refers to the year in which the firm actually reduces its reporting and 
the year afterwards. Results are based on 439 observations in the treated group and 1,130 in the control group 
for Foreign ETR, 437 and 1,128 for Foreign ETR Current and 412 and 1,085 for GAAP ETR respectively. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the 
level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
As expected, we identify a negative and statistically significant estimator for 
all of our ETR measures in table 8. Accordingly, we can assure that the trend in 
additional tax avoidance due to the decision to noticeably change disclosure of 
foreign subsidiaries exists. 
Choosing the treatment year has a great impact on our results. To assure that 
our results do not identify a general trend, we perform a placebo test by shifting 
the treatment year considered, i.e. the year in which our changing firms decide to 
reduce the level of disclosure in Exhibit 21, for our difference-in-differences 
estimation by one year in each direction.20 We expect to find no significant effect. 
Table 9 shows the respective results. 
                                                          
20
 Note that our sample size changes slightly as some firm-year observations are missing now. 
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Table 9: Varying Change Disclosure Year: Difference-in-Differences Results 
after 1:5 Nearest Neighbors Matching 
1:5 NN 
Baseline Follow Up Diff-in-
Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Shifting one year back   
 
   
Foreign ETR 0.247 0.233 0.014 0.252 0.230 0.022 0.008 
  
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.017) (0.015) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.263 0.247 0.017 0.276 0.252 0.024 0.008 
  
  
(0.019) 
  
(0.019) (0.018) 
GAAP ETR 0.291 0.276 0.015 0.279 0.273 0.006 -0.009 
  
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.012) (0.015) 
  
       
Shifting one year forward      
 
Foreign ETR 0.230 0.240 -0.009 0.235 0.235 0.000 0.010 
  
  
(0.016) 
  
(0.020) (0.018) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.244 0.257 -0.013 0.254 0.256 -0.001 0.012 
  
  
(0.016) 
  
(0.020) (0.018) 
GAAP ETR 0.271 0.287 -0.016 0.291 0.286 0.005 0.022 
  
  
(0.013) 
  
(0.016) (0.016) 
Notes: Table 9 presents difference-in-differences results after one to five nearest neighbors matching with 
Foreign ETR Current as outcome variable by showing the mean outcome of Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR 
Current and GAAP ETR for treatment and control group before and after the decision to substantially reduce 
disclosure as well as its difference. In the upper part “Shifting one year back” the change year is shifted one 
year back. Results are based on 231 observations in the treated group and 595 in the control group for 
Foreign ETR, 232 and 596 for Foreign ETR Current and 220 and 583 for GAAP ETR respectively. In the 
other half of the table “Shifting one year forward” the change year is shifted one year forward. Results in this 
part are based on 208 observations in the treated group and 535 in the control group for Foreign ETR, 205 
and 532 for Foreign ETR Current and 192 and 502 for GAAP ETR respectively. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 
%, respectively. 
In line with our expectation, Table 9 depicts no significant results for any 
specification. Thus, the results support our assumption that the different 
development in our tax avoidance measures is driven by the decision to 
55 
2.4.3. Robustness Checks – Alternative Measures for Treatment 
In further robustness checks, we focus on two different modifications of our 
treatment group identification in order to show the robustness of our main results. 
Once again, we apply our favored matching algorithm, i.e. the one to five nearest 
neighbors with Foreign ETR as outcome variable. Table 10 depicts the respective 
difference-in-differences results. 
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Table 10: Alternative Measures for Change in Disclosure: Difference-in-
Differences Results after 1:5 Nearest Neighbors Matching 
1:5 NN 
pre-change year change year Diff-in-
Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
Including total assets reclassification 
 
  
 
 
Foreign ETR 0.252 0.232 0.020 0.230 0.240 -0.010 -0.030** 
  
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.016) (0.013) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.276 0.252 0.025 0.244 0.257 -0.013 -0.038** 
  
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.016) (0.017) 
GAAP ETR 0.273 0.279 0.007 0.271 0.287 -0.016 -0.023* 
  
  
(0.012) 
  
(0.013) (0.013) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
Considering U.S. Subsidiaries 
 
  
 
 
Foreign ETR 0.248 0.228 0.020 0.237 0.242 -0.005 -0.025* 
  
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.016) (0.014) 
Foreign ETR 
Current 0.274 0.250 0.024 0.248 0.263 -0.015 -0.039** 
  
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.017) (0.018) 
GAAP ETR 0.279 0.275 0.003 0.269 0.287 -0.018 -0.022 
  
  
(0.012) 
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
Notes: Table 10 presents difference-in-differences results after one to five nearest neighbors matching with 
Foreign ETR Current as outcome variable by showing the mean outcome of Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR 
Current and GAAP ETR for treatment and control group before and after the decision to substantially reduce 
disclosure as well as its difference. “Pre-change year” refers to the year before the decision and “change year” 
to the year in which the firm actually reduces its reporting. In the upper part “Including total assets 
reclassification” treatment firms are reclassified as control firm if their total assets simultaneously decline by 
more than 50 percent. Results are based on 260 observations in the treated group and 664 in the control group 
for Foreign ETR, 254 and 657 for Foreign ETR Current and 239 and 623 for GAAP ETR respectively. In the 
other part “Considering U.S. subsidiaries” treatment firms are not considered as treatment firms if firms do 
not also reduce their list of subsidiaries including U.S. subsidiaries by more than 50 percent. Results are 
based on 270 observations in the treated group and 654 in the control group for Foreign ETR, 264 and 648 for 
Foreign ETR Current and 248 and 615 for GAAP ETR respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by firm 
are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively 
Restructuring might be partly a reason for the reduction in the list of foreign 
subsidiaries disclosed in some cases. Therefore, we account for changes in Exhibit 
21 due to M&A activities in our first variation. We assume that a firm’s total 
assets should noticeably decline, if it sells parts of its business. Hence, in the 
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upper specification (“including total assets reclassification”) we do reclassify 
treatment firms as control firm, if not only the number of foreign subsidiaries 
declines by more than 50 percent, but also the firm’s total assets. The other 
prerequisites remain unchanged compared to our main specification. This time we 
identify 180 firms that changed disclosure prior to the matching. After the 
matching, we identify 260 treatment and 664 control observations for our main 
variable of interest, Foreign ETR. We are able to confirm our results as the 
difference-in-differences estimators are negative and statistically significant for 
Foreign ETR, Foreign ETR Current and GAAP ETR. Moreover, the economical 
magnitude is of a similar size as well.  
In the lower part of table 10 (“considering U.S. subsidiaries”), we do also 
consider U.S. subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21. This time, we do not consider a 
firm as changing substantially its disclosure in Exhibit 21, if the firm does not also 
reduce its list of subsidiaries by more than 50 percent when we consider the full 
list of subsidiaries, i.e. including U.S. subsidiaries. Imposing this definition on our 
sample, we identify 179 firms that substantially shortened their list of subsidiaries 
prior to the matching. Doing our propensity score matching, we identify 270 
treated and 654 control observations for Foreign ETR. The difference-in-
differences coefficients are again negative and significant for our foreign tax 
avoidance measures (Foreign ETR and Foreign ETR Current). For GAAP ETR, 
our difference-in-differences estimator is just insignificant (p-value of 0.101). 
Hence, the results presented in table 10 confirm mainly our findings that our 
treatment firms avoid additional taxes. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
While it is well known that MNEs use different tax planning strategies to 
reduce their tax burden, there is less knowledge about how public disclosure 
affects the scope of international tax avoidance. Therefore, the aim of our study is 
to provide new insight into the relationship between public disclosure of group 
structures of U.S. MNEs and tax aggressiveness.  
We analyze the effect of public disclosure on the attitude of tax 
aggressiveness by taking into account the phenomenon that several companies 
removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 between 2009 
and 2014. Our study identifies more than 250 U.S. MNEs that reduced more than 
50 percent of their significant foreign subsidiaries. In an empirical analysis, we 
use PSM to compare the scope of tax avoidance of these firms with the tax 
avoidance behavior of U.S.-based MNEs that did not change their disclosure of 
foreign subsidiaries.   
Our empirical results reveal a significantly different development in 
international tax avoidance resulting from the decision to become less transparent. 
Those firms with vanishing foreign subsidiaries in their Exhibit 21 become more 
tax aggressive after changing their public disclosure behavior compared to firms 
that did not change their public disclosure attitude. Our findings are supported by 
a series of robustness tests, applying different tax avoidance measures, matching 
algorithm, treatment years and treatment firm specifications. 
Our study contributes to the recent debate about tax transparency. From our 
analysis, we conclude that tax aggressiveness and public disclosure are related. 
Therefore, our results suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country 
information could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior.  
 59 
APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
CAPINT ppeveb / at 
Changing Disclosure 
Firm 
Dummy, which equals one if the number of 
subsidiaries has declined by > 50 percent from t
-1 to t0 
and (i) ≥ 10 subsidiaries are vanished from Exhibit 
21, (ii) this definition if still fulfilled from t
-1 to t1 
Foreign ETR (txfo + txdfo) / pifo 
Foreign ETR Current txfo / pifo 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi) 
HAVEN Number of tax haven subsidiaries scaled by total 
number of foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 21 
LEV (dltt + dlc) / at 
NOL Dummy variable, which equals one if there was a decrease in tlcf from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t 
PROFITABILITY pi / at 
R&D xrd / at 
SIZE log (at) 
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Firms – Is the Dividend Penalty Linked to ETRs? 
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Abstract:  
This study investigates whether firms being highly engaged in corporate tax 
planning react more sensitive to an exogenous variation of the relationship 
between personal dividend and capital gains tax rates than firms which are less 
engaged in corporate tax planning. We compile a large cross-country data set from 
18 countries (G7 merged with the EU15 member states) over ten years with 
several tax rate variations. Our findings confirm prior research by showing that a 
firm’s payout decreases if dividends are more heavily taxed than capital gains. 
However, applying a wide range of different measures for corporate tax planning 
behavior, we cannot identify significant differences in payout policy between 
those firms being more engaged in tax planning and other firms as reaction to the 
relationship of dividend to capital gains taxation. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Prior research extensively investigates all facets of corporate tax avoidance 
a firm uses to reduce its overall tax bill. Besides the scientific debate, the general 
public has drawn considerably attention to aggressive tax avoidance of 
multinational entities (MNEs) recently. The debate has been stimulated by very 
low effective tax rates (ETRs) disclosed in consolidated financial statements of 
well-known firms. For example, according to its 10-k filings, Google Inc. paid 
only $2,598 billion taxes on its worldwide profits in 2012, resulting in an ETR of 
19.4 %.21 As statutory tax rates on corporate income are mostly higher than 19 % 
in most industrialized countries, Google’s ETR does not reflect common 
expectations about the tax level imposed. 
Therefore, one may conclude that taxes have become more and more 
important for firms and the general public. The recent debate primarily focuses on 
corporate taxes. However, as a big party of the debate – the public – consists of 
potential investors, the discussion should consequently also take the investor’s 
personal tax burden into account. In most countries corporate earnings are not 
only reduced by taxation at the corporate’s level, but also at the investor’s level in 
terms of capital income taxes. As all involved parties nowadays seem to be more 
sensitive to corporate tax burdens, we wonder whether firms being highly engaged 
in corporate tax planning react stronger to a country’s tax law change regarding 
the relationship of personal dividend to capital gains taxation than other firms. 
The ratio behind this research question is given by the fact that a firm’s 
management on the one hand influences the intensity of the firm’s corporate tax 
planning (cf. Graham et al., 2014) and on the other hand also decides about the 
                                                          
21
 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513028362/d452134d10k.htm# 
toc1452134_9. 
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amount of cash which is distributed to its shareholders via dividend payments 
where according to Brav et al. (2005) personal shareholder taxation has an impact.  
Having this link between firms’ ETRs and their payout policies in mind, it is 
straightforward to investigate whether dividend tax planning comes along with or 
follows corporate tax planning. Moreover, a deeper understanding of firms’ 
personal tax planning behaviors also might lead to a more distinct view of a 
management’s impact on the tax planning policy. Thereby, it might lighten the 
consequences of a tax rate variation regarding dividend or capital gains taxation 
for dividend payout in a given country. 
We compile a large cross-country data set from 18 countries (G7 and the 
EU15 member states)22 over ten years (from 2004 through 2013) in this study. 
Considering this research design, we are left with 49 variations of the relationship 
of dividend to capital gains tax rates and about 70,000 firm-year observations. 
This allows us to capture the effect of many changes in the relationship of 
dividend to capital gains taxation and therefrom to see whether corporate tax 
sensitive firms react stronger to these changes. However, our findings only show – 
in accordance with Jacob and Jacob (2013) – a general negative effect of the 
relationship of dividend to capital gains tax rates on firm payout. Thus, employing 
various different measures for corporate tax sensitivity, we do not identify any 
significant deviation from the average effect. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we provide 
additional evidence and confirm prior literature findings. Firms consider existing 
differences in personal tax rates for dividends and capital gains when they choose 
the amount of dividends paid to their shareholders (Brav et al., 2005; Chetty and 
Saez, 2005, 2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). 
                                                          
22
 Table 1 lists the corresponding 18 countries. 
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Accordingly, the often met dividend tax penalty23 in a country affects all dividend 
paying firms. This emphasizes the importance of the relationship of dividend to 
capital gains tax rates for all firms. Second, we provide several tests whether firms 
being relatively more engaged in corporate tax planning do react more sensitive to 
their investors’ personal taxation when determining their level of payout. Our 
contribution ties on prior literature’s surveys which indicate that a firm’s 
management influences both corporate tax planning and the level of dividend 
payments where personal tax rates do play a role (Brav et al., 2005; Graham et al., 
2014). However, the results of this paper indicate that a firm’s sensitivity for its 
shareholders’ personal tax burden does not necessarily go hand in hand with its 
corporate tax planning attitude.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents 
prior literature and outlines the theoretical framework. Section 3.3 describes the 
methodology, identification strategy and the data used in this study. In Section 
3.4, we depict our results and section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Theoretical Considerations 
3.2.1. Prior Literature 
The question whether the way private shareholders are taxed affects a 
corporate’s payout policy, is linked to different empirical finance literature’s 
strands (for an overview see Allen and Michaely, 2003). To dedicate oneself to 
                                                          
23
 The term dividend tax penalty was first introduced by Poterba and Summers (1984). It 
implicates a tax system in which the personal dividend tax rate is higher than the personal capital 
gains tax rate. Thus, dividends exhibit a “tax penalty”. 
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this question, it is important to know the tax status of a firm’s investors.24 More 
specifically, it is of interest whether an investor is tax-exempt or not. Although 
empirical findings are not unambiguous, strong evidence for investors not being 
fully tax-exempt exists (Michaely and Vila, 1995; Dhaliwal, Erickson and 
Trezevant, 1999; Graham, 2008) and therefore personal capital income taxation 
has an impact for a private investor receiving a MNE’s payout. 
Prior literature identifies that the difference in taxation of dividends and 
capital gains is reflected in firms’ payout policies (Chetty and Saez, 2005, 2006; 
Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). Additionally, a 
survey of Brav et al. (2005) reveals that a firm’s management cares about its 
shareholders’ personal tax burden. Moreover, prior research finds that rather firms 
than investors react to changes in dividend and capital gains taxation 
(Korkeamaki, Liljeblom and Pasternack, 2010). As financial executives generally 
classify share repurchases and dividends as equally attractive for most investors 
(Brav et al., 2005), a top executive paying attention to shareholders’ tax burden 
should react sensitive to changes in the proportion of dividend to capital gains tax 
rates. Hence, a firm’s dividend payout ratio should change accordingly. 
Considering a firm’s own tax bill, it is well known that firms engage in 
different types of tax planning to lower their corporate tax burden (for an 
overview see Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). A broad literature has already 
analyzed different tax planning strategies used by MNEs to reduce their overall 
tax bill. MNEs exploit international tax rate differentials by means of transfer 
pricing for intra-firm sales and intra-firm royalties (Clausing, 2003; Karkinsky 
                                                          
24
 For reasons of simplicity and following equilibrium arguments, we consider all investors of a 
given firm as marginal investors in this study. For a discussion whether to speak of price changes 
of investors or of a specific marginal investor in this context, cf. Guenther and Sansing (2010), 
p.850. 
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and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and O’Connell, 2014) as well as subsidiaries 
located in tax havens or other low-tax countries (Hines and Rice, 1994; Desai, 
Foley and Hines, 2006; Huizinga and Laeven, 2006; Klassen and LaPlante, 2012a, 
2012b; Blouin, Robinson and Seidman, 2015).  
Adding to this, prior literature not only reveals channels used for profit-
shifting, but also shows ample evidence that the level a firm engages in coporate 
tax planning depends on individual top executives. For example, Dyreng, Hanlon 
and Maydew (2010) find that individual top executives have a decisive influence 
on firms’ ETR measures that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. More 
specifically, they identify a difference of approximately 11 percent in effective tax 
rates between the top and the bottom quartiles of executives. Moreover, Graham 
et al. (2014) find in a survey that answers from 600 corporate tax executives are 
pointing towards firms’ managements being highly interested in corporate tax 
planning. Besides reducing a firm’s overall tax burden, from a management’s 
point of view, corporate tax planning is seen as a source to increase earnings per 
share (Graham, Campbell and Rajgopal, 2005; Graham et al., 2014).  
Even though prior literature shows ample evidence executives conduct 
corporate tax planning as well as personal tax planning, so far – to the best of our 
knowledge – no study has analyzed whether at a firm’s high engagement in 
corporate tax planning is associated with a particularly high sensitivity to personal 
capital income taxation. Put differently, this study analyzes whether a 
management being highly engaged in corporate tax planning is also committed to 
reduce the personal tax bill of its investors. 
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3.2.2. Theoretical Framework 
The relationship of dividend to capital gains taxation is important for a 
firm’s payout policy, because investors face the following simple trade-off game: 
An investor can either receive a dividend payment of a firm while just holding the 
stock in his portfolio around the ex-day or sell the stock one day before the ex-day 
cum dividend and rebuy it the next day when the stock trades ex dividend. The 
investor receives the dividend amount in cash and finally owns the corresponding 
stock in both scenarios, yet the tax rate for each scenario might differ. The reason 
for this is that in the first case the dividend tax rate is applicable whereas in the 
second case the capital gains tax rate is applicable. Hence, if a firm’s investor is 
not fully tax-exempt, he should not be indifferent between receiving the same 
amount of cash via dividend payments or via capital gains. An investor should 
rather prefer the alternative which yields a lower tax burden. Therefore, firms 
should adapt their payout policy to private tax rate changes for dividends or 
capital gains, if they care about their shareholders’ tax burden. Thus, they should 
react to the given dividend tax penalty. 
Beyond that, a management survey from Brav et al. (2005) reveals that 
personal tax rates for dividend and capital gains matter for the determination of a 
firm’s level of payout dedicated to dividend payments. Moreover, a study from 
Desai and Jin (2011) uses a sample of institutional shareholders which are 
heterogeneous in their tax characteristics to analyze whether firms adapt their 
payout policy due to exogenous tax changes. They find convincing evidence that 
firms adjust their payout policy in these cases.  
As already outlined in section 3.2.1, existing studies show some firms 
engage in corporate tax planning while others do not (Weisbach, 2002). Prior 
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literature results clearly show that the (top) management cares noticeably about 
the amount of corporate taxes paid (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2010; Graham 
et al., 2014). Accordingly, the level of corporate tax avoidance depends on the 
individual managers’ preferences and behavior.  
Linking these findings to those of Brav et al. (2005) mentioned above, we 
conclude that a firm’s management not only cares about its corporate tax burden, 
but also considers its shareholder’s personal tax payments. Therefore, if a firm’s 
management is relatively more involved in reducing its corporate tax burden, we 
suggest that it is also more engaged in reducing their shareholders’ tax bills. 
3.3. Research Design 
3.3.1. Empirical Model 
In this study, we employ an OLS regression with industry-year and firm 
fixed-effects. Our dependent variable is firm i’s dividend yield at time t+1 
(DIVYIELD). We use DIVYIELD at time t+1, because the t+1 year’s dividend 
payment is usually linked to the accounting results of year t. Hence, we employ 
the following difference-in-differences approach to explain our dependent 
variable DIVYIELD: 
ܦܫ�ܻܫܧ�ܦ�,௧+ଵ =  ߙ଴ +  ߙଵܲܧܰܣ�ܶ �ܻ,௧+ଵ + ߙଶܲܧܰܣ�ܶ �ܻ,௧+ଵݔ ܶܣܺܲ�� +ߙଷ�ܧ��,௧ + ߙସܵܣ�ܧܵ�,௧ + ߙହܱܶܤܫܰܵܳ�,௧ +ߙ଺ܧܤܫܶܦܣ�,௧ + ߙ଻ܥܣܵܪ�,௧ + ߙ଼ܵܫܼܧ�,௧ + ߙଽܩܦ �ܲ,௧ +�௦,௧ + ߛ� + ��,௧ (1) 
PENALTY is defined as a simplified version of the dividend penalty 
introduced by Poterba and Summers (1984), which is reduced in this paper to 
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PENALTYi,t = �೏�,�−�೎��,�ሺଵ−�೎��,�ሻ . It varies across countries and time as md and mcg are the 
corresponding personal dividend and personal capital gains tax rates for year t 
according to firm i’s resident country. We believe this measure to be appropriate, 
because it reflects the relationship of personal dividend and capital gains tax rates 
in a rather intuitive way as it is negative if md < mcg (or positive if md > mcg) and 
thus, its coefficient α1 is easy to interpret. We use this measure as a proxy for the 
firms’ shareholders’ tax rates. Certainly, we recognize that shares are owned by 
several types of national and international shareholders facing different dividend 
and capital gains tax rates. However, we believe this benchmark to be most 
compelling, because earlier studies have found a significant home-bias of 
investment in shares (French and Poterba, 1991; Mondria and Wu, 2010). 
Accordingly, we assume that each country’s private shareholders account for a 
large part of investment in their own country. Consequently, we expect α1 to be 
negative and statistically significant, if firms care on average about their 
investors’ personal tax burden.  
Our coefficient of interest is α2 of the interaction term PENALTY x TAXPL. 
TAXPL is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that are considered as caring 
more about their corporate tax burden than other firms and zero, if this is not the 
case. Thus, the coefficient α2 captures the specific effect of a country’s dividend 
penalty for corporate tax sensitive firms on firm payout. Accordingly, if those 
firms caring more about their corporate tax burden also care more intense about 
their shareholders’ tax burden, we expect α2 to be negative and statistically 
significant.  
Corporate tax planning literature has implemented a huge variety of proxies 
to measure firms’ engagement in corporate tax planning. Therefore, this paper 
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follows different, well-established strategies to measure a firm’s tax planning 
behavior and hence to define TAXPL.  
One of the most popular ways to assess a firm’s tax planning activity is the 
use of its ETR which can be calculated in different ways (cf. Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). ETR measures are considered as being volatile on a year-to-year 
basis, but using ETRs of more than one fiscal year is considered as a good 
measure for a firm’s long-term tax planning behavior (Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew, 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Therefore, we start our analysis by 
applying 10-year averages of GAAP ETR and GAAP ETR Current to separate the 
calculated averages into two groups for the definition of TAXPL.  
In our second approach, we draw on a convincing measure developed by 
Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay (2012). They assess a firm’s engagement in 
corporate tax planning by comparing its ETR with the average ETR of its size and 
industry peers. Once again, we separate the resulting ETR difference for all firms 
into two groups to define our dummy variable TAXPL.  
Finally, an even more sophisticated approach to identify a firm’s level of 
corporate tax planning is to run a pre-regression of a firm’s ETR on different firm-
level variables that are linked to corporate tax planning opportunities. Afterwards 
the actual level of tax planning is benchmarked by using the residuals of this pre-
regression. This procedure follows the assumption that leaving variables being 
associated with aggressive tax avoidance out of the pre-regression shapes the 
resulting residuals in such a way that one can easily select those firms which are 
more likely to be engaged in corporate tax planning (cf. Wooldridge, 2009: 31).  
Other studies show that certain firm characteristics are associated with tax 
avoidance. Especially a firm’s affiliation to industries which are known as being 
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more likely engaged in corporate tax planning than other industries are commonly 
used characteristics. This is usually expressed by scaled research and development 
expenditures (Harris, 1993; Grubert, 2003) or dummy variables that account for a 
firm’s affiliation to industries that typically generate the most profits from 
intellectual property (De Simone, Mills and Stomberg, 2014). Therefore, we 
assume that a firm’s engagement in corporate tax planning and thus our TAXPL 
variable can be defined using these characteristics.  
Introduced by prior literature (Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 1997; Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch, 2000; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Skinner 2008; Jacob and 
Jacob, 2013), the independent variables LEV, SALES, TOBINSQ, EBITDA, CASH, 
SIZE and GDP represent firm-level or country-level control variables which 
potentially determine a firm’s dividend yield. Their definitions are all explained in 
appendix 1. Additionally, to prevent the influence of outliers, we omit 
observations of our independent variable that are not within the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of observations. The terms js,t and γi represent industry-year and firm-
fixed effects whereas ��,௧ is a zero mean disturbance term. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by country. 
3.3.2. Data Description 
As we are interested in a potential influence of the relationship of personal 
dividend taxation to capital gains taxation on the payout policy of firms which are 
heterogeneous in their intensity of corporate tax avoidance, we collect information 
about the personal dividend and capital gains tax rates applied in the 18 
considered countries (G7 merged with the EU15 member states). In particular, we 
collect these tax rates for each year during the period from 2004 until 2013. For 
reasons of consistency, we consider only personal tax rates according to the 
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highest personal income tax bracket for countries where no flat tax on capital 
income applies. The personal tax rates used in this study are carefully collected 
from the European Tax Handbook, KPMG Individual Income Tax Rate Survey, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide Individual Tax Summaries and Ernst and 
Young Worldwide Personal Tax Guide. Table 1 lists dividend tax rates and capital 
gains tax rates for each country in 2013. 
Table 1: Personal Capital Income Tax Rates 2013 
Country md mcg 
Austria 0.25 0.00 
Belgium 0.25 0.33 
Canada 0.36 0.25 
Denmark 0.42 0.42 
Finland 0.22 0.32 
France 0.37 0.30 
Germany 0.26 0.26 
Greece 0.10 0.20 
Ireland 0.20 0.30 
Italy 0.20 0.20 
Japan 0.10 0.10 
Luxembourg 0.22 0.44 
Netherlands 0.25 0.00 
Portugal 0.28 0.28 
Spain 0.21 0.21 
Sweden 0.30 0.30 
United Kingdom 0.31 0.28 
United States 0.20 0.15 
Notes: Table 1 shows personal dividend (md) and capital gains (mcg) tax rates for each country in 2013.  
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Accounting data, dividend information and stock prices used in this study 
are collected from Compustat and Compustat Global. All share prices are daily 
closing prices from Monday to Friday each week in the considered period.25 The 
corresponding accounting information belongs to each firm’s prior fiscal year end, 
i.e. firm i’s dividend and stock price information of the year 2010 is linked to its 
accounting information of December 31, 2009 when its fiscal year corresponds 
with the calendar year.  
Our final sample consists of 72,623 firm-year observations. It includes 
13,106 distinct firms located in 18 distinct countries. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for our dependent and independent variables of equation (1). 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25
th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
DIVYIELD 72,623 0.0192 0.0210 0.0000 0.0286 
PENALTY 72,623 0.0096 0.0875 0.0000 0.0000 
LEV 72,623 0.1973 0.1676 0.0492 0.3073 
SALES 72,623 0.2959 0.5057 0.0196 0.4096 
TOBINSQ 72,623 1.1009 0.9099 0.5319 1.3420 
EBITDA 72,623 0.1136 0.0696 0.0644 0.1498 
CASH 72,623 0.1121 0.1110 0.0291 0.1582 
SIZE 72,623 6.3767 1.8265 5.0637 7.5441 
GDP 72,623 29.1916 1.0933 28.6105 30.2032 
Notes: Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in equation (1). Variables are defined in 
appendix 1.  
                                                          
25
 However, if a given daily share price information stems from a feast day in the corresponding 
country, the price information actually reflects the price from the last trading day. 
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3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Measuring Corporate Tax Planning Affinity by ETRs 
Average ETR Measures 
In a first step, we use the most intuitive way to define our dummy variable 
TAXPL by using the averages of our ETR measures GAAP ETR and GAAP ETR 
Current between 2003 and 2012.26 Prior research shows that firms usually sustain 
their tax position over time (Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams, 2013). However, 
ETR measures are considered as being volatile. As we are interested in a firm’s 
general stance on tax planning, we smooth our ETRs by their 10-year average. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for our average GAAP ETR and average GAAP 
ETR Current by firm. The total number of observations varies accordingly to 
missing values for GAAP or GAAP ETR Current information. Furthermore, our 
results face no sample selection bias, because all coefficient estimates are of 
similar magnitude across all specifications. 
Table 3: Average ETR Measures – Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25
th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
GAAP ETR  12,403 0.3331 0.1304 0.2632 0.4057 
GAAP ETR Current 9,761 0.3039 0.1534 0.2033 0.4003 
Notes: Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our 10-year average ETR measures by firm. Variables are 
defined in appendix 1.  
Table 3 shows a 10-year average GAAP ETR (GAAP ETR Current) of all 
sample firms of 33.31 (30.39) percent and reasonable values for the lowest and 
the highest quartile.  
                                                          
26
 Note that in some cases the ETR measure is not provided by Compustat for some of the years in 
our sample period. In these cases, we use the average of the years provided by Compustat. 
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The next table shows our first regression results. In Column (1) our 
interaction term PENALTY x TAXPL is not included. Thereby, column (1) depicts 
that our coefficient estimates are in line with prior literature. In particular, the sign 
and magnitude of all control variables which are significantly different from zero 
is reasonable. In columns (2) – (5) we include our interaction term and define 
TAXPL in two different ways: In columns (2) and (4) of table 4 TAXPL is equal to 
one for all firms that have an average ETR measure that belongs to the lowest 5 
percentiles and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (5) we use the lowest 25 
percentiles instead. The used ETR measures are GAAP ETR Current (columns (2) 
and (3) of table 4) and GAAP ETR (columns (4) and (5) of table 4). All 
specifications are augmented with industry-year and firm fixed-effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by country. 
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Table 4: Low Average ETR Measures – Regression Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PENALTY -0.0091** -0.0100** -0.0087** -0.0090** -0.0092** 
  (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0033) 
PENALTY x TAXPL 
 
0.0010 -0.0051 -0.0247 -0.0005 
  
 
(0.0149) (0.0041) (0.0179) (0.0068) 
LEV -0.0087* -0.0099** -0.0099** -0.0098** -0.0098** 
  (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
SALES 0.0002 0.00001 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
TOBINSQ -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0018** 
  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
EBITDA 0.0227 0.0208 0.0209 0.0224 0.0224 
  (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
CASH 0.0055** 0.0054* 0.0055* 0.0052* 0.0052* 
  (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
SIZE 0.0023* 0.0023 0.0023 0.0020 0.0020 
  (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP -0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0002 
  (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
CONSTANT 0.0175 -0.0216 -0.0216 0.0089 0.0108 
  (0.1030) (0.1450) (0.1440) (0.1090) (0.1070) 
Industry-Year FE √ √ √ √ √ 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ √ 
N 72,623 58,504 58,504 66,025 66,025 
R² 0.710 0.681 0.681 0.698 0.697 
Notes: Table 4 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions with DIVYIELD as dependent variable. The 
definition of TAXPL differs in columns (2)-(5). The TAXPL dummy is one for all firms whose average 10-
year GAAP ETR Current is equal to or below the 5th (column (2)) or 25th (column (3)) percentile. The TAXPL 
dummy is one for all firms whose average 10-year GAAP ETR is equal to or below the 5th (column (4)) or 25th 
(column (5)) percentile. Robust standard errors clustered by country are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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As all columns of table 4 show a clearly negative coefficient for PENALTY, 
we confirm the results of prior research who found that a positive increase of 
PENALTY reduces the dividend yield of firms in the corresponding country, i.e. 
on average firms react to more unfavorable dividend taxation by reducing their 
payout. Moreover, the magnitude of our effect is reasonable and in line with prior 
literature. Given an assumed increase of 0.1 for PENALTY27 and our sample’s 
mean average DIVYIELD of 0.0192, from column (1) follows a relative change of 
dividend yield of -4.6 percent or a decrease of 0.0009 in DIVYIELD.28 The results 
for PENALTY are robust in columns (2) to (5) as neither the coefficients nor the 
level of significance do distinctly vary.  
Considering our research question, the interaction term of PENALTY x 
TAXPL does not show any significance at all. Thus, we cannot conclude from 
table 4 a particularly stronger effect of PENALTY for firms being more engaged in 
corporate tax planning. Consequently, we cannot affirm that if a firm’s 
management cares relatively more about its corporate taxes, it is also more 
engaged in reducing their shareholders’ tax bills.  
The coefficients of our other control variables are in line with our 
expectations and economically reasonable. Similar to prior literature, we find a 
statistically significant and negative influence of TOBINSQ and LEV (Jensen, 
1986; Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000) as well as a positive influence of SIZE 
and CASH (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Skinner, 2008). 
                                                          
27
 For example, an increase of 0.1 in PENALTY would result, if a tax system which primarily taxed 
dividends at a 10 percent rate changed to a tax rate of 20 percent without taxing capital gains at 
all. 
28
 Assuming the same PENALTY increase of 0.1, the corresponding coefficient and average 
dividend yield of Jacob and Jacob (2013) leads to an average decrease in a firm’s dividend yield 
of 6.2 percent. 
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Deviation from Size and Industry Peers 
In the following, we identify firms as being relatively more engaged in 
corporate tax planning through their ETRs’ deviation from their size and industry 
peers’ ETR. Thereby, we follow an approach introduced by Balakrishnan, Blouin 
and Guay (2012). We calculate each firm’s deviation from its corresponding peer 
group’s ETR with the subsequent routine:  
For each firm we gather a benchmark portfolio of firms which either belong 
to the same industry or are in the same quintile of firm size measured by total 
assets. Afterwards, we calculate the mean ETR of all firms belonging to this 
benchmark portfolio. In a next step, we subtract each firm’s ETR measure from 
the respective average portfolio ETR.  
Finally, we consider the resulting difference to define our dummy vaiable 
TAXPL. It is equal to one if the difference belongs to the highest 5 percentiles 
(columns (1) and (3) of table 5) or the highest quartile (columns (2) and (4) of 
table 5) and zero otherwise. Once again, the ETR measures used in this 
calculation are the 10-year average GAAP ETR and the 10-year average GAAP 
ETR Current. Besides the changed definition for TAXPL, we do not change any 
other detail in our regression. Table 5 shows the corresponding results: 
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Table 5: ETR Deviation from Size and Industry Peers – Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PENALTY -0.0120 -0.0145* -0.0076 -0.0083* 
 
(0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0046) 
PENALTY x TAXPL 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
LEV -0.0099** -0.0099** -0.0098** -0.0098** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
SALES 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
TOBINSQ -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0018** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
EBITDA 0.0208 0.0208 0.0224 0.0224 
 
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
CASH 0.0054* 0.0054* 0.0052* 0.0052* 
 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
SIZE 0.0023 0.0023 0.0020 0.0020 
 
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
CONSTANT -0.0216 -0.0220 0.0112 0.0110 
 
(0.1450) (0.1450) (0.0108) (0.0108) 
Industry-Year FE √ √ √ √ 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
N 58,504 58,504 66,025 66,025 
R² 0.681 0.681 0.697 0.697 
Notes: Table 5 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions with DIVYIELD as dependent variable. The 
definition of TAXPL differs in all columns. The TAXPL dummy is one for all firms whose 10-year average 
GAAP ETR Current difference from its size and industry peers’ is equal to or above the 75th (column (1)) or 
95th (column (2)) percentile. In columns (3) and (4) the similar definition for TAXPL is applied with the 10-
year average GAAP ETR as measure for a firm’s tax planning affinity. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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In line with prior literature and the prior results of this paper, table 5 depicts 
a negative and, in columns (2) and (4), also a significant effect of PENALTY.29 
Once again we do not find any significant results for our interaction term 
PENALTY x TAXPL. Hence, we again identify a negative effect of a 
discriminating dividend tax relative to a country’s capital gains taxation. 
However, our results do not reveal a particularly stronger negative effect for firms 
which we declare through our TAXPL dummy to be relatively more engaged in 
corporate tax planning. 
Pre-Regressions 
In the last approach using the ETR measures to identify firms being more 
concerned about their corporate tax burden, we use an OLS (pre-)regression with 
the respective ETR as dependent variable. We include only general firm 
characteristics influencing a firm’s ETR measure that are not considered as being 
part of aggressive tax planning as independent variables in our equation (2)30: 
ܧܴܶ �,௧ =   ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵܫܼܧ�,௧ + ߚଶܥܣܲܫܰ �ܶ,௧  +  ߚଷ�ܧ��,௧ +  ߚସܴܱܣ�,௧ +�௦,௧ + ݓ� + ��,௧ (2) 
Therefore, this regression leaves the aggressive part of tax planning 
unexplained. In other words, firms with low (i.e. negative) predicted residuals are 
                                                          
29
 However, the fact that PENALTY is not significantly negative in columns (1) and (3) of table 5 
only shows that PENALTY and the interaction term PENALTY x TAXPL are correlated in such a 
way that considering both of them as independent variables reduces the significance of both 
terms. 
30
 Note that we cannot consider tax loss carry forward as independent variable for non-U.S. firms, 
because Compustat Global does not provide this variable. Therefore, even though we consider an 
existing tax loss carry forward as an explanatory independent variable without being linked to 
aggressive corporate tax planning, we do not include it in our regression for consistency reasons. 
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more involved in additional tax planning than firms with higher residuals.31 As we 
are specifically interested in tax aggressive firms and prior research shows that 
firms usually sustain their tax position over time (Guenther, Matsunaga and 
Williams, 2013), we identify these firms as those having an average residual in 
our sample period lower than or equal to the 5th percentile (columns (1) and (3) of 
table 6) or the 25th percentile (columns (2) and (4) of table 6). For these firms our 
dummy variable TAXPL is defined as one whereas it is zero for all other firms in 
our sample. In columns (1) and (2) GAAP ETR Current is used as dependent 
variable for the regression of equation (2) whereas GAAP ETR is used in columns 
(3) and (4). All other independent variables (SIZE, CAPINT, LEV and ROA) are 
explained in appendix 1. The terms js,t and ݓ� represent industry-year and firm-
fixed effects, respectively. ��,௧ is a zero mean disturbance term. 
                                                          
31
 Summary Statistics for the variables used for the OLS regression of equation (2) are reported in 
appendix 2. The respective OLS regression results can be found in appendix 3. 
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Table 6: Pre-Regression Approach – Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PENALTY -0.0099** -0.0108*** -0.0089* -0.0111*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0044) (0.0037) 
PENALTY x TAXPL -0.0022 0.0045 -0.0088 0.0045 
  (0.0077) (0.0030) (0.0087) (0.0026) 
LEV -0.0099** -0.0099** -0.0098** -0.0098** 
  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
SALES 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
TOBINSQ -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0018** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
EBITDA 0.0208 0.0208 0.0224 0.0223 
  (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
CASH 0.00543* 0.0054* 0.0052* 0.0052* 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
SIZE 0.0023 0.0023 0.0020 0.0020 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
GDP 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
CONSTANT -0.0216 -0.0196 0.0107 0.0099 
  (0.1450) (0.1440) (0.1080) (0.1090) 
Industry-Year FE √ √ √ √ 
Firm FE √ √ √ √ 
N 58,504 58,504 66,025 66,025 
R² 0.681 0.681 0.697 0.697 
Notes: Table 6 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions with DIVYIELD as dependent variable. The 
dummy variable TAXPL is defined by using the average residuals after regression (2). In columns (1) and (2) 
GAAP ETR Current was used for the regression of equation (2) whereas GAAP ETR was used in columns (3) 
and (4). The TAXPL dummy is one for all firms whose average residuals are equal to or below the 5th 
(columns (1) and (3)) or 25th (columns (2) and (4)) percentile. Robust standard errors clustered by country are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Similar to all other specifications of TAXPL, we can confirm our 
expectations regarding PENALTY and our other control variables. However, we 
cannot confirm that firms caring relatively more about their corporate tax burden 
care also more about their shareholders’ personal tax burden than other firms.  
3.4.2. Alternative Measures for Corporate Tax Planning Affinity  
Previous studies have confirmed that the mobility of income increases for 
firms with high intangible asset ownership or high expenses for R&D (Harris, 
1993; Grubert, 2003; De Simone, Mills and Stomberg, 2014). This increase in 
mobility of income reflects in lower ETR measures and therefore potentially leads 
to tax aggressiveness. Hence, we use these attributes in the following for another 
definition of our dummy variable TAXPL.  
Firms in high-tech and pharmaceutical industries mostly possess significant 
intellectual property and products with global demand. As the assignment of 
intellectual property to affiliates located in low-tax jurisdictions is – depending on 
the type of intellectual property – associated with limited effort, these firms are 
seen as having more opportunities to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions via 
transfer pricing and hence are more sensitive about their corporate tax burden. 
According to De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014), we use three-digit SIC 
codes to compute TAXPL (column (1) of table 7) which equals one if the industry 
membership of the parent is supposed to be have more profit shifting 
opportunities.32  
                                                          
32
 We classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 
(Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). 
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In columns (2) and (3) of table 7, we use the average of R&D expenses 
(xrd) scaled by total assets (at) between 2003 and 2012.33 Similar to the average 
ETR measures used in section 3.4.1, we use 10-year averages to smooth the effect 
of outliers. In column (2) (column (3)), TAXPL equals one for all firms that 
belong to the highest 5 (25) percent concerning R&D expenditures and zero 
otherwise. 
                                                          
33
 We require companies to have non-missing values for all components of our variables. 
However, visual inspection of several Form 10-k filings reveals that many of the missing values, 
especially for R&D expenses, in Compustat should be coded as zero. Therefore, we set missing 
values of the variable R&D to zero. 
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Table 7: Industry Affiliation and R&D Activities – Regression Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
PENALTY -0.0092** -0.0092** -0.0109* 
 
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0054) 
PENALTY x TAXPL 0.0007 0.0024 0.0073 
 
(0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0069) 
LEV -0.0087* -0.0087* -0.0087* 
 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
SALES 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
TOBINSQ -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0017** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
EBITDA 0.0227 0.0227 0.0227 
 
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
CASH 0.0055** 0.0055** 0.0056** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
SIZE 0.0023* 0.0023* 0.0023* 
 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
GDP -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
CONSTANT 0.0176 0.0176 0.0208 
 
(0.1030) (0.1030) (0.1040) 
Industry-Year FE √ √ √ 
Firm FE √ √ √ 
N 72,623 72,623 72,623 
R² 0.713 0.713 0.713 
Notes: Table 7 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions with DIVYIELD as dependent variable. The 
definition of TAXPL differs. In column (1) TAXPL equals one if a firm belongs to an industry being 
associated with more profit shifting opportunities and zero otherwise. The definition of income mobile 
industries follows De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014). The TAXPL dummy is one for all firms whose 
average 10-year R&D expenditure scaled by total assets is equal to or above the 95th percentile (column (2)) 
or respectively the 75th percentile (column (3)) and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Similar to the results presented in our other tables, we are able to confirm 
prior research’s findings regarding the coefficient of PENALTY, but we cannot 
confirm our additional suggestion that firms identified as being relatively more 
engaged in corporate tax planning are also more sensible to their shareholders’ tax 
rates. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing additional 
evidence and confirming prior literature that firms consider existing personal tax 
rates for dividends and capital gains when they choose the amount of dividends 
paid to the shareholders (Brav et al., 2005; Chetty and Saez, 2005, 2006; Brown, 
Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). Moreover, it provides 
additional tests whether this reaction is related to firm’s corporate tax planning 
affinity. 
Thereby, this paper merges prior accounting and finance literature and 
investigates whether a firm’s corporate tax planning activity constitutes a criterion 
by which firms can be separated concerning their level of awareness for their 
shareholders’ tax burden. However, applying a huge variety of specifications to 
identify those firms being relatively more involved in corporate tax planning 
activities, we conclude that firms overall care about their shareholders’ dividend 
and capital gains taxation, but that this is not only or even more typical for firms 
having relatively low ETRs or relatively large possibilities for income shifting.  
With this finding, we confirm prior literature. Our results show that a firm’s 
dividend yield decreases, if dividends are more heavily taxed compared to capital 
gains. Moreover, the magnitude of our measured negative effect is similar to 
previous findings from finance literature. 
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However, we cannot unambiguously show that all firms are equally 
sensitive to the relationship of dividend to capital gains taxation. Having 
employed several different corporate tax planning measures, we find that a higher 
degree of corporate tax planning is not a valid separation criterion to identify 
firms whose dividend yield will react stronger to changes in the relationship of 
dividend to capital gains taxation. Nevertheless, as the knowledge of firms’ 
shareholder tax sensitivity might be important to estimate firm payout 
consequences following a personal capital income tax variation, we are looking 
forward to further investigations to that topic by future research.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
CAPINT Property, Plant and Equipment scaled by total assets (ppegt / at) 
CASH The amount of cash divided by total assets (ch / at) 
DIVYIELD Total amount of dividends paid by one firm divided by its average share price in this year. 
EBITDA The actual EBITDA divided by total assets (ebitda / 
at) 
GAAP ETR 
Quotient of total tax expense and pre-tax income in 
which extraordinary items are not included (txt / (pi-
xi)) 
GAAP ETR Current 
Quotient of current taxes and pre-tax income in 
which extraordinary items are not included (txc / (pi-
xi)) 
GDP Natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product in U.S. Dollars 
LEV Sum of long- and short-term leverage scaled by total 
assets ((dlc+dltt) / at) 
PENALTY 
Difference between a country’s personal dividend tax 
rate and a country’s personal capital gains tax rate 
scaled by one minus this country’s personal capital 
gains tax rate ((md-mcg) / (1-mcg)) 
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets (pi / at) 
SALES The increase of sales (sale) over two years divided by the amount of sales two years ago. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (at) 
TOBINSQ 
Number of shares outstanding times the share price at 
the end of the year plus the sum of long- and short-
term leverage scaled by total assets (((csho*prccdat) 
+ (dlc+dltt)) / at) 
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Appendix 2: Pre-Regression – Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25
th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
SIZE 59,641 6.3876 1.8218 5.0696 7.5628 
LEV 59,641 0.1747 0.1671 0.0441 0.3084 
ROA 59,641 0.0656 0.0617 0.0371 0.1090 
CAPINT 59,641 0.4893 0.3919 0.2209 0.8313 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for all independent variables of our pre-regression. Variables are 
defined in appendix 1. 
Appendix 3: Pre-Regression – Regression Results 
 
(1) (2) 
SIZE 0.0087 0.0404*** 
 
(0.0081) (0.0121) 
LEV -0.0332 -0.138* 
 
(0.0268) (0.0788) 
ROA -0.480** -0.710*** 
 
(0.0218) (0.222) 
CAPINT 0.0225 -0.0103 
 
(0.014) (0.0348) 
CONSTANT 0.318*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.0526) (0.0353) 
Industry-Year FE √ √ 
Firm FE √ √ 
N 59,641 45,846 
R² 0.556 0.54 
Notes: This table shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions with GAAP ETR (column (1)) and GAAP 
ETR Current (column (2)) as dependent variable. Variables are defined in appendix 1. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Abstract:  
This study analyzes whether tax incentives play a role in the legal assignment of 
trademarks registered for the U.S. market by large multinational enterprises. Our 
analysis for U.S. S&P 500 firms suggests that tax considerations have a limited 
influence on the geographical allocation of trademarks. However, if trademarks 
are assigned to affiliates located offshore, we find a significant influence of 
corporate tax rates and U.S. withholding taxes. Comparing these results to the 
assignment of U.S. trademarks registered by European firms (STOXX 600 
Europe), we are able to identify that U.S. firms are more sensitive to a tax rate 
decrease in certain tax haven countries than European firms. 
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4.1. Introduction 
We analyze large multinational companies’ geographical allocation choices 
regarding the ownership assignment of their U.S. trademarks and whether these 
are driven by tax considerations. Matching the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s (USPTO) register with group structures of large multinational entities 
(MNEs) from the U.S. (S&P 500), we describe and explain the geographic origin 
of U.S. trademark registrations submitted by these global companies. 
Furthermore, we compare U.S. firms’ strategies to those of large MNEs from 
Europe (STOXX Europe 600). 
Trademarks are important intangible assets in modern business and often 
represent fundamental drivers of firm value. They enable companies to distinguish 
their products from competition and serve to convey corporate identity. Today, the 
world’s top 100 brands, embodied within trademark rights, feature estimated 
market values ranging from USD 12 billion (J.P. Morgan) up to USD 128 billion 
(Apple).34 Investors acknowledge the value of trademarks (Sandner and Block, 
2011) and expect positive cash flow effects from new registered trademarks 
(Krasnikov, Mishra and Orozco, 2009).  
Against this background, multinational entities may seek tax advantages in 
holding trademark assets offshore. There is indeed anecdotal evidence on MNEs 
strategically designating subsidiaries in low-tax countries to hold their trademark 
rights. For example, one of the world’s biggest producers of sporting goods, Nike 
Inc., has assigned numerous trademark rights to subsidiaries located in Bermuda 
                                                          
34
 Brand Finance, Global 500 – The annual report on the world’s most valuable global brands, 
February 2015. Available for download: http://brandfinance.com/images/upload/brand_finance_ 
global_500_2015.pdf. 
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(McIntyre, Phillips, and Baxandall, 2015).35 These trademarks may be used in 
foreign retail markets by entities which pay a royalty to the trademark-owners in 
Bermuda. While increasing profits in Bermuda, these royalty payments reduce 
Nike’s taxable profits in retail markets. As there is no corporate income tax in 
Bermuda, this is an attractive tax saving strategy which could, among other 
factors, explain Nike’s very low foreign effective tax rate (ETR) of only 2.2 
percent in 2014.36 
Previous empirical literature shows that MNEs engage in tax-motivated 
income-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008; Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2014). Moreover, there exists 
compelling empirical evidence that this may involve the tax-efficient geographical 
allocation of intangible assets within the group (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; 
Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b). With 
respect to the types of intangibles at the heart of international tax saving 
strategies, previous work concentrates on the role of patents. Using patent data 
registered at the European patent office (EPO), earlier studies suggest that patent 
ownership within MNEs indeed responds to international tax incentives 
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and O’Connell, 2014; Boehm et al., 
2015). Dudar and Voget (2016) analyze the tax response of patent and trademark 
assignments for a pooled sample of European and U.S. firms. Still, very little is 
known about the relevance of U.S. trademarks for international tax planning of 
large MNEs, considering the particularities of the U.S. context. Moreover, 
previous literature analyzes tax incentives for the use certain international firm 
                                                          
35
 There are further examples of international tax planning strategies involving trademarks and a 
number of consultancies explicitly advocate such strategies. Also see Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011) for a discussion.  
36
 See Nike Inc.’s 2014 10-k: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320187/00003201871400 
0097/nke-5312014x10k.htm#s1BA25FBD5706D09A386C71629FCDD9A6. 
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structures (Dyreng et al., 2015; Lindsey and Wilson, 2015), but does not consider 
the allocation of intangible assets within U.S. MNEs. 
We fill this research gap and analyze the extent to which international tax 
incentives drive the geographical ownership allocation of trademarks filed at the 
USPTO within large U.S. MNEs and European MNEs. As the Nike Inc. example 
shows, trademarks, just as other intangibles, exhibit characteristics of a public 
good (Markusen, 1995). Thus, they can be used as a non-rival input separate from 
other affiliates in the group. Moreover, appropriate royalty rates should be at 
arm’s length. As the valuation of intangibles is difficult, MNEs may be able to 
distort intra-group royalty prices in order to shift additional income to the 
trademark-owner. Whereas for other kind of intangibles R&D investment must 
usually take place at an early stage to finance creative inventions, most investment 
in a trademark is undertaken after its assignment and registration, because 
continuous extensive marketing is necessary to establish a new trademark 
(Sandner and Block, 2011). As a consequence, the allocation of trademarks might 
be relatively flexible, because value creation takes place in the long term. On the 
other hand, if the user of a trademark undertakes these advertising activities at his 
own risk, the associated expenditures have to be reflected in the royalty paid to the 
trademark’s owner (OECD, 2015). The potential to shift profits to low-tax 
countries decreases accordingly.  
As this study deals with trademarks registered at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, the particularities of U.S. trademark law must be carefully 
considered. Licensing of U.S. trademarks is indeed riskier than licensing other 
intellectual property (Chestek, 2001). In particular, there exist stringent legal 
requirements with respect to any licensor’s control over the nature and quality of 
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the goods or services to which the mark is applied by license. These stringent 
requirements under U.S. law provide an important reason for the allocation of 
U.S. trademark ownership either to the parent company or the entity that actually 
uses the trademark (Heavner and Luepke, 2008). Moreover, firms tend to 
concentrate their trademark holding in the U.S., because intangible assets as key 
drivers of firm value should be located at home. Thereby, their protection is 
associated with litigations in the U.S.  
Whether tax considerations are dominated by non-tax considerations, e.g. 
linked to trademark law, or still play a significant role in the trademark 
assignment within MNEs is, ultimately, an empirical issue. To investigate the tax 
sensitivity of trademark allocation within MNEs, we exploit a new dataset 
provided by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) containing all 
trademarks registered for the U.S. market between 2003 and 2012 (for a detailed 
description of the dataset see Graham et al., 2013). We match the trademark 
registration data with international group structures of large U.S. MNEs and 
European MNEs listed respectively in the S&P 500 or the STOXX Europe 600 
Index. 37  Eventually, our matched data sample combines rich trademark data, 
96,762 USPTO registrations in total, with detailed information about the 
trademark-owning entities and their affiliated group. This data provides deep 
insight into the patterns of U.S. trademark ownership in global MNEs.  
The results from the data analysis are twofold. First, we find that there is a 
strong home bias in trademark ownership. U.S. MNEs listed in the S&P 500 hold 
and register 95.7 percent of their U.S. trademarks in the United States. Similarly, 
European MNEs listed in the STOXX Europe 600 locate 89.9 percent of their 
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 The matching procedure is described in the data section 4.3. 
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U.S. trademark portfolio either directly at a U.S. subsidiary, i.e. in the country of 
protection and use, or alternatively in their parent country. Only 16.6 percent of 
U.S. trademarks owned by S&P 500 firms in our sample are held in classical tax 
haven countries. Still, some tax havens turn out to be important trademark holding 
locations. For example, Ireland and Switzerland are popular for both U.S. and 
European MNEs whereas Bermuda is highly frequented by U.S. firms.  
Based on these explorative results, we consider the underlying location 
choice to be a two-step choice: The first choice is whether to locate trademark 
ownership in a third country or at the headquarter location (offshore decision). 
Conditional on locating it in a third country, the second step is to select the 
respective third country (foreign location decision).  
Our empirical analysis starts with the offshore decision, i.e. whether to 
locate trademark ownership in the U.S. or abroad. Interestingly, we do not identify 
tax considerations as an important factor in this choice. However, we find a strong 
concentration of trademarks’ ownership location in Delaware which is 
acknowledged to be a domestic U.S. tax haven (Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 
2013; Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). In total numbers, U.S. firms locate 43,770 
trademarks, i.e. 53.5 percent of all successful registrations, in Delaware. 
Accordingly, we assume that tax considerations indeed play a role when a firm 
chooses the U.S. affiliate for trademark ownership.  
Getting to the foreign location decision, the tax elasticity of trademark 
location choice is indeed significant and negative. Moreover, we find that 
withholding taxes imposed on royalty payments between the U.S. and a potential 
trademark location significantly lower the respective country’s probability to 
actually host a U.S. trademark. Simulating a one percentage point decrease in the 
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statutory tax rate of some selected countries, we identify that especially tax haven 
countries benefit from this cut in statutory tax rate. We find that Ireland reacts 
with a cross semi-elasticity of 21.8, i.e. compared to the base probability before 
the cut in tax rate, Ireland gains 21.8 percent in base probability. Similarly other 
tax haven countries (Bermuda and Switzerland) react rather sensitive while high 
tax countries like Canada and Germany have lower cross semi-elasticities of 2.5 
and 0.7. Comparing these results to the location choice of European MNEs, we 
find that U.S. firms react slightly more sensitive to a one percentage point cut in 
statutory tax rate of tax haven countries.  
Our results contribute to the debate on the magnitude and elasticities of 
international tax avoidance by IP-intensive multinational firms. Tax authorities 
have raised increasing concerns about the relocation of intangible assets to low-
tax countries. Furthermore, the OECD has put forward an action plan to encounter 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). One action point on the agenda deals 
specifically with issues related to the tax treatment of intangibles (OECD, 2015). 
IP-intensive firms are primary targets of this agenda, because the income deriving 
from intangible assets is considered to be especially mobile (De Simone, Mills 
and Stomberg, 2014). Moreover, the mobility of income has been shown to 
increase with a company’s R&D and advertising expenditure (Harris, 1993; 
Grubert, 2003).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we 
discuss the influence of tax considerations within the process of trademark 
location decision. Section 4.3 describes our dataset and methodology. Empirical 
results are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2. Tax Avoidance Through Trademark Use 
4.2.1. Trademark Registration and Ownership 
In modern business, trademarks are a primary tool of corporate marketing, 
communication and brand building. More specifically, a trademark can be any 
word, name, symbol, device or any combination of these that enables one party to 
distinguish its goods and services from those of other parties.38 In other words, 
trademarks act as a certificate of origin and quality. More generally, it can help to 
communicate a company’s values and identity. The value of a trademark lies in 
the goodwill and consumer recognition it represents. Against this background, 
U.S. law offers several ways to protect a trademark used in the United States. 
Protection thereby means the ability of trademark owners to exclude unauthorized 
parties from using similar marks on identical or confusingly similar products 
(Calboli, 2007).  
The ownership of a trademark derives from use. Under U.S. common law, 
the first user of a distinctive trademark in commerce is generally provided with 
protection of this trademark inside of the geographic region it is used in. It is thus 
not necessary to register a trademark in order to own it. However, common law 
trademark rights are limited in geographical scope and the owner also lacks a clear 
title to his mark.39 As a consequence, absent registration, trademark rights can 
diminish quickly over time and place and be lost due to interrupted use and 
disuse. Considering these limitations, a trademark registration at the USPTO is 
attractive. In particular, the certificate of registration creates a presumption 
(‘prima facie evidence’) of ownership and establishes a right of priority covering 
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 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
39
 Bohan Mathers, LLC: Who Owns a Trademark? URL: http://www.bohanmathers.com/who-
owns-a-trademark.html. 
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the entire United States regardless of where the mark is actually used.40 
Besides filing an application directly at the USPTO, the owner of a 
trademark might file an international application under the Madrid Protocol or the 
Paris Convention. International applications name the countries in which the 
registrant seeks protection for the respective trademark and are filed through the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). These applications do not 
constitute a unique international registration, but rather one separate registration in 
each of the designated countries following the law of these countries (World 
Intellectual Property Organization, 2012). In other words, WIPO hands the 
applications to the respective office the applicant claims protection for, but each 
office examines the international application in the same way as applications filed 
directly at this office.41 For our analysis, this difference in administrative process 
is not of interest. 
4.2.2. International Tax Planning Strategies Built Around Trademarks 
From a tax perspective, the appeal of holding U.S. trademarks away from 
the parent arises from the international profit shifting potential. Trademarks held 
in an entity set up in a low-tax jurisdiction can, in principle, be licensed to the 
parent company or other affiliates within the multinational group which use the 
mark in U.S. commerce. The royalties paid in compensation for the trademark 
license are treated as tax-deductible expense to the licensees which may operate in 
                                                          
40
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057. Successful registration of a trademark requires that it is in use or is 
intended to be in use, see 15 U.S.C. § 1051. However, the filing date of an application for 
registration at the USPTO constitutes “constructive use” of the mark, conferring a nationwide 
right of priority over a later date of actual first common law use, see 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). Also 
note that a trademark registration remains active for ten years. It can be renewed in a ten-year 
term if the trademark is continuously used (see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058(a), 1059(a)). 
41
 In contrast to direct U.S. applications, international applications are usually not based on 
immediate use in the U.S. market, but on an existing foreign registration or an earlier application 
filed at a foreign office. We conducted our analysis in section 3.2 for international and direct 
U.S. applications separately. As we could not identify any noteworthy difference, we do not 
differentiate between international and direct applications in the following.   
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the U.S., whereas the royalty income received by the licensor is taxed at low rates 
or remains even tax-free. This income may be later repatriated as dividend 
payment to the parent company, the sole stockholder of the trademark owning 
entity. 42  The result is a reduction in the overall tax burden of the respective 
multinational company.  
The tax reduction is definite if the MNE’s home country exempts foreign 
dividends from taxes. The exemption system is applied in most European 
countries. The U.S., however, does not tax-exempt foreign dividends. 
International double taxation of profits is avoided by granting credits for foreign 
taxes paid, which reduce the U.S. home country tax liability. Accordingly, any 
profits shifted from high-tax countries to trademark owners in tax-favorable 
jurisdictions generate no ultimate tax savings for U.S. MNEs, because residual 
U.S. tax is levied when the foreign profits are repatriated as dividends to the U.S. 
parent. Whether the mere deferral of home country tax liabilities creates 
sufficiently strong incentives for U.S. MNEs to engage in strategic allocation of 
trademark ownership is ultimately an empirical question. 43  Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that multinationals domiciled in exemption countries, on 
average, shift more income than do those domiciled in credit countries (Markle, 
2016). 
Some further important nuances of international tax regimes may affect the 
tax benefits arising from income shifting via trademark allocation. In particular, 
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 For a general description of international tax planning strategies, including the role of 
intangibles and holding structures, see Russo (2007) and, more specifically, Fuest et al (2013). 
43
 U.S. MNEs are indeed known to hold much cash overseas to avoid the U.S. repatriation taxes: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-12/cash-abroad-rises-206-billion-as-apple-to-
ibm-avoid-tax. Also see Lindsey and Wilson (2015) for a discussion. The financial reporting 
standards in the U.S. reflect the income tax treatment if the earnings are deemed to be 
indefinitely reinvested in the foreign country. In other words, under APB 23 in U.S. GAAP (and 
IAS 12 in IFRS), the tax expense related to the U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings is not 
recorded until the dividend is paid and the cash tax payment is due. Also see Markle (2015) for a 
discussion. 
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withholding taxes and controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation might 
militate against the license model (Cohen, 2008; Markle and Robinson, 2012). For 
example, according to national law, the U.S. levies a 30% withholding tax on 
gross royalty payments, which indeed seems particularly relevant for trademarks 
used in U.S. commerce. From a tax perspective, we thus expect U.S. trademarks 
to be allocated to foreign countries that avoid high U.S. withholding taxes on 
royalties through a good network of double tax treaties with the United States 
and/or other relevant countries involved. Moreover, to limit benefits from 
international tax planning that are considered as inappropriate, many capital 
exporting countries have introduced some form of CFC legislation. These special 
tax regimes target non-trading income derived by foreign entities of resident 
MNEs which are subject to critically low tax rates. Once a CFC rule turns 
binding, the advantage from the deferral of home country tax liabilities (credit 
countries) or from the exemption of foreign dividends (exemption countries) is 
effectively nullified by consolidating the foreign entity’s non-trading income with 
that of its parent company and taxing it as it is earned. Although MNEs may find 
ways to overcome CFC legislation, these rules pose certain obstacles to the license 
model.44  
Furthermore, the license model raises international transfer-pricing issues. 
Basically, the trademark owner is entitled to the income deriving from the 
exploitation of a trademark right. Appropriate royalty rates should be at arm’s 
length. As the valuation of intangibles is difficult, MNEs may be able to distort 
                                                          
44
 U.S. CFC rules under Subpart F of the U.S. IRC can be circumvented by so-called check-the 
box elections, with the consequence that intra-company royalty flows are disregarded and only 
revenues from transactions with customers, which due to exceptions included in the Subpart F 
provisions typically do not constitute Subpart F income, are considered from a U.S. perspective. 
In the European Union, CFC legislation has been limited by the European Court of Justice 
(Cadburry Schweppes, ECJ, 2006): As long as certain structures are not merely artificially 
motivated by tax purposes but also by economic activity, CFC rules do not apply. 
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intra-group royalty prices in order to shift additional income to the trademark 
owner. In return, if the user of a trademark undertakes advertising activities to 
enhance trademark value at his own risk, the associated expenditures have to be 
reflected in the royalty paid to the trademark’s owner (OECD, 2015). The 
potential to shift profits to low-tax countries decreases accordingly. 
After all, tax considerations might not only lead MNEs to locate their U.S. 
trademarks in tax attractive locations outside the U.S. Some U.S. states, Delaware 
in particular, offer attractive tax rules for intangible assets as well. Specifically, 
Delaware exempts from state-level corporate income tax those corporations whose 
activities are confined to the maintenance and management of their intangible 
investment.45 Accordingly, a tax avoidance strategy that exploits this rule involves 
implementation of a Passive Investment Company (PIC) or Delaware Intangible 
Holding Company (DIHC) which is designated to hold ownership in intangible 
assets. Subsequently, income is shifted into these entities from other U.S. states 
principally through the same mechanism as outlined previously, i.e. intra-firm 
license agreements and associated royalty payments.46  
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 See 30 Del. C. § 1902(b)(8). Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming may provide 
similar tax benefits as they impose not state-level corporate income tax at all.  
46
 This strategy is described by an abundant legal literature. It is “probably the most well known 
aggressive tax planning technique” (Bankman, 2007: p. 778) in U.S. state taxation.  
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The role of Delaware as a domestic tax haven inside the U.S. is 
quantitatively explored in Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock (2013). They show that, 
using a Delaware-based tax strategy, U.S. firms can decrease their U.S. state 
income tax burden by 15-24 percent. Still, immediate cash tax savings from 
domestic strategies are quantitatively smaller than those resulting from 
international strategies which involve non-U.S. IP locations. However, domestic 
strategies generate permanent benefits whereas tax savings from multinational 
avoidance are only temporary until the foreign profits are eventually repatriated to 
the United States. From this perspective, a domestic PIC strategy may be more 
potent than similar multinational strategies (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Markle, 
2016; Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 2013, Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). 
However, initiatives taken by other U.S. states to fight the Delaware tax strategy 
turn out to be effective, as well. 47 
The decision made by U.S. firms to implement subsidiaries in Delaware or 
rather abroad in some foreign tax haven is empirically analyzed by Lindsey and 
Wilson (2015). Interestingly, neither Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock (2013) nor 
Lindsey and Wilson (2015) explicitly consider the distinct role of trademarks in 
their analysis.  
4.2.3. Restrictions of Tax Avoidance Strategies Through Trademarks 
A multinational company generally owns a collection of trademark related 
rights which, in their diverse forms of protection, together with the embodied 
values or goodwill represent the brand (Cohen, 2008). For an MNE, the question 
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 Two countermeasures are considered. The first measure is combined reporting which requires a 
company to include the net profits of all its domestic entities in a consolidated or combined tax 
return, effectively eliminating intra-company transfers that make the Delaware PIC strategy 
possible. The second measure considered is an economic nexus doctrine that requires firms to 
file and pay taxes based on economic presence, thus allowing states to tax the royalty income 
that escapes taxation in the state of Delaware (Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 2013). 
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arises whether and where to consolidate these rights. Some international 
companies with U.S. affiliates simply choose to have one of their U.S. 
subsidiaries file the U.S. applications in its own name. In some cases, local 
subsidiaries may even register a trademark at the USPTO without the knowledge 
of the parent company. Enforcement of marks owned by many different local 
subsidiaries can be difficult and lead to ineffective protection strategies on an 
international scale (Heavner and Luepke, 2008). Consolidating all trademark 
rights into one single entity which then owns all trademark registrations world-
wide avoids inconsistent ownership in trademark registrations and, in addition, 
helps to police the marks and exploit their value to the maximum (Heavner and 
Luepke, 2008; Cohen, 2008). From this perspective, the entity that is designated 
to hold the trademark rights can be the parent company or, alternatively, a holding 
company. This choice will be driven by tax considerations on the one hand and by 
the particularities of trademark law on the other hand. 
This role of trademarks might be special, however. In particular, legal 
literature highlights differences in the riskiness of tax avoidance strategies built 
around trademarks as opposed to other types of intangibles. More specifically, 
particularities of U.S. trademark law result in the licensing of trademarks being 
riskier than licensing other intellectual property. Licensing trademarks, under 
certain conditions, implies the risk of losing the right to use the trademark 
whereas no corresponding risk is incurred in the case of other intangibles 
(Chestek, 2001).  
First, in the United States, both under common law and the Lanham Act (15 
U.S.C. §§1051-1127), an assignment of a trademark without the associated 
goodwill (“in gross”) is deemed invalid and the assignee acquires no rights in the 
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mark. In other words, a trademark cannot exist independently of the business it 
represents. If the subsidiary designated to hold the trademark rights does no 
business other than licensing, it may be difficult to claim that any goodwill at all 
is associated with the trademark.48  
Second and perhaps more importantly, the requirements for a trademark 
license to be valid are higher in the United States than they are in many other 
countries. The main difference is that the trademark licensor in the United States 
must, by statute, exercise sufficient control and supervision over the nature and 
quality of the goods or services to which the mark is applied by its license 
(Heavner and Luepke, 2008). If the licensor fails to exercise such control, the 
license may be considered a “naked” license and that may lead to an abandonment 
of rights in the mark and its registration. The U.S. judiciary answers the question 
of adequate control on a case-by-case basis (Chestek, 2001; Calboli, 2007). 
Although courts have repeatedly proven reluctant in requiring a strict application 
of quality control and rather adopted a pragmatic approach, there remains 
considerable uncertainty as to what constitutes a valid license (Calboli, 2007). To 
avoid the risk of losing the right to use a trademark, the owner of the mark needs 
to set quality standards in any license agreement, list the ways in which control 
over these standards is exercised and, finally, be up to review and enforce these 
standards. In particular, an offshore subsidiary may have difficulties in arguing 
that it controls its parent’s or sisters’ use of the mark and associated goods and 
services (Chestek, 2001; Calboli, 2007). The stringent licensing requirements 
provide an important reason to designate as owner and applicant of a trademark 
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 See Lawrence Stanley: “Trademark Holding Companies: Speculative Benefits, Certain Pitfalls”, 
blog post, dated January 9, 2012. URL: https://webtm.com/trademark-holding-companies-
speculative-benefits-certain-pitfalls/. Lawrence Stanley is Associate at Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius LLP. 
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either the parent company or the entity that actually uses the trademark (Heavner 
and Luepke, 2008). In other words, U.S. trademark law militates against holding 
U.S. trademarks away from the parent or from the using U.S. entity.49 
Whether tax considerations are dominated by non-tax considerations, e.g. 
linked to trademark law, or still play a significant role in the trademark 
assignment within multinational companies is, ultimately, an empirical issue. 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1.  Data  
In order to conduct our empirical analysis we require information on the 
legal ownership of U.S. trademarks within MNEs’ group structures. The 
trademark data is taken from the USPTO register.50 A trademark application at the 
USPTO needs to be filed by the mark’s legal owner (Graham et al., 2013). Thus, 
we can infer from the USPTO data the legal owners of the registered trademarks 
and where those entities reside. Besides information on trademark ownership 
including name, address and further applicant information, the USPTO database 
contains, for each trademark respectively, the date of filing, registration and the 
classes of goods and services covered. We use the update 2012 dataset which 
includes registrations until January 2013 and consider trademarks successfully 
registered between 1st January 2003 and 31st December 2012. We do not include 
renewal registrations. Trademark renewal will certainly follow the primary filing, 
                                                          
49
 Of course, the parent company can itself be located in a tax attractive jurisdiction. For example, 
Delaware is by far the most common state of parent company incorporation among publicly 
traded U.S. enterprises. The role of Delaware as primary location for incorporation of parent 
companies is due to legal benefits that evolved from regulatory competition among U.S. states 
(Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2002; Roe, 2003; Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 2013).  
50
 The full dataset is available for download at http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ 
electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0. For a more detailed description of the 
dataset see Graham et al. (2013).  
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potentially leading to strong dependence of the respective data points and 
problems of double counting. 
We match this information to the ownership structures of U.S. companies, 
i.e. companies that do have their headquarters and/or their incorporation in the 
U.S., listed in the S&P 500 Index and, in addition, to European companies listed 
in the STOXX Europe 600 Index. With respect to the ownership structures of the 
S&P 500 firms, we exploit the information disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k. 
As already established by prior literature (see for example Dyreng and Lindsey, 
2009; Lindsey and Wilson, 2015), Exhibit 21 reveals information about a firm’s 
significant subsidiaries and their countries of incorporation. 51  Exhibit 21 is 
available at the SEC’s database EDGAR.52 We have collected this information for 
the fiscal year 2007. As the transfer of intangible assets usually results in heavy 
tax consequences, we assume that the trademark is registered by a company 
remaining in the group and changes in ownership structure within the group of 
companies should not be of any interest for our analysis. In our matching 
procedure, we use legal names and countries of incorporation. We require the 
country of incorporation to perfectly match and the company name to match at 
least to 99.4 percent.53  
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 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), a subsidiary can be deemed not to be a 
significant subsidiary if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the parent company’s 
and its other subsidiaries’ investments in the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent of the parent 
company’s total assets; (2) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share 
of the assets of the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent of the consolidated firm’s total assets; 
and (3) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the subsidiary’s 
pre-tax income from continuing operations does not exceed ten percent of the consolidated 
income from continuing operations. 
52
 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. Note that the country Georgia 
cannot be distinguished from the U.S. state Georgia in our dataset, and we therefore deleted 
Georgia from our sample. 
53
 The challenge is to match the legal name as little misspellings or the usage of abbreviations for 
companies’ legal forms might hinder the matching. Therefore, we searched the company names 
for commonly used legal forms and replaced all written out legal forms with its abbreviations. 
More-over, we deleted space characters from the spelling and changed it to the use of small 
letters only. 
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Moreover, we add financial data obtained from COMPUSTAT. Statutory 
corporate tax rates, information on CFC legislation in the U.S. and European 
countries as well as special tax treatment of trademark income (trademark boxes) 
are collected from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and 
tax surveys provided by EY, KPMG and PwC. Macroeconomic data is obtained 
from the World Bank and CEPII GEODIST. U.S. Marginal Tax Rates derive from 
Graham’s database.54 All variables used are described in Appendix 1. We require 
non-missing values for all country characteristics. After all, our final dataset 
includes 478 S&P firms that registered 81,766 new trademarks for use in U.S. 
commerce between 2003 and 2012. A detailed overview regarding data collection 
is reported in Appendix 2. 
For additional analysis, we match the USPTO information to the ownership 
structures of European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 Index during 
2007. The information on ownership structures is obtained from the AMADEUS 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk and financial information from 
COMPUSTAT GLOBAL. All other control variables reveal from the same 
sources as used for the U.S. firms. The data covers 235 STOXX Europe 600 firms 
based in sixteen countries which are reported in Appendix 3. These firms 
registered 14,984 new U.S. trademarks during the same time period. 
4.3.2. Methodology  
In our empirical framework, we model the MNE's trademark allocation 
decision as a two-step process: We first analyze the determinants of the corporate 
decision to locate legal ownership of U.S. trademarks offshore and then, in a 
second step, investigate the tax and non-tax country characteristics that attract 
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 Simulated marginal tax rates (MTR), based on the methodology of Graham (1996), are available 
for download at: https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html.   
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legal ownership of U.S. trademarks, conditional on offshoring ownership. This 
two-step framework for analysis is consistent with other studies modeling the 
geographical allocation of intangible asset ownership within MNEs, e.g. with 
Boehm et al. (2015) who investigate the geographical split between R&D activity 
and patent ownership, or more generally, with the framework for analysis of 
MNEs' choice on transnational capital investment as proposed by Horstmann and 
Markusen (1992) and extended by Devereux (2007). 
Accordingly, in the first part of our empirical analysis, we assess potential 
determinants of the decision whether to locate trademark ownership in the U.S. or 
offshore ("offshore decision"). Specifically, we define a binary variable 
OFFSHOREi,n,t which takes on the value 1 if firm i locates the ownership of 
trademark n at time t in a foreign country and 0 otherwise. Following the latent 
variable approach to binary choice models, we specify an unobserved underlying 
latent variable OFFSHORE* as  
           ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ∗௜,�,� = �଴ +  �ଵܯܴܶ௜,�,� +  �ଶ�௜,�,� + �4�௜,�,� + ε௜,�,� (1) 
Our model accounts for a set of explanatory variables. On the one hand, 
these encompass factors that reflect the incentive to shift income and allocate 
assets offshore. More specifically, US MTR is a firm’s simulated marginal federal 
corporate income tax rate according to the methodology put forward by Shevlin 
(1990) and Graham (1996, 1999). Simulated marginal tax rates take into account 
the most important dynamic features of the U.S. tax code, i.e. net operating loss 
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carry-forwards and carry-backs, investment tax credits etc.55 Along the lines of 
Lindsey and Wilson (2015) who model firm-level characteristics associated with 
the location of subsidiaries in domestic versus foreign tax haven jurisdictions, we 
expect a significant positive coefficient for US MTR. The higher the tax costs for 
an additional dollar of U.S. income, the higher should be the incentives to allocate 
trademark ownership abroad.  
Moreover, valuable trademarks should carry more income shifting potential 
than less valuable ones and, thus, we expect valuable trademarks to be located 
offshore with higher probability. 56  We follow Sandner and Block (2011) and 
approximate trademark value by the number of goods and service classes for 
which it is registered. When filing an application, it is possible to seek protection 
for several goods and service classes. Trademarks with few classes tend to protect 
single products or narrow product lines whereas trademarks awarded to many 
classes rather protect wider product lines or so-called umbrella-brands (Erdem, 
1998; Cabral, 2000; Sandner and Block, 2011). The breadth and market scope of a 
trademark, as reflected in the number of goods and services for which it is 
registered, should correlate positively with its ability to influence consumer 
behavior and purchasing decisions, and, thus, with its value (Economides, 1988; 
Sandner and Block, 2011). 
Furthermore, we follow Lindsey and Wilson (2015) and try to capture firm-
specific characteristics that reflect a firm's 'operational wherewithal' to use foreign 
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 According to Graham (1996), simulated marginal tax rates are calculated for each ﬁrm and year 
separately by assuming that taxable income follows a random walk with drift over 18 years into 
the future. Then, the present value of the tax bill is calculated. Subsequently, it is recalculated 
after adding one dollar to taxable income in the current period. Results from 50 simulations 
(based on 50 separate forecasts of taxable income) are averaged to ﬁnally represent the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc marginal tax rate. We obtained simulated marginal tax rates from John Graham's 
homepage: https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html. 
56
 The role of patent value in international tax planning strategies built around patents is 
highlighted by Boehm et al. (2015). 
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low-tax jurisdictions and shift profits abroad. To this aim, we include in vector X 
of equation (1) the variables ADVERT EXPENSE, defined as advertising expense 
scaled by total assets, and PROFITABILITY, defined as the ratio of gross profit to 
total sales, as well as INCOME MOBILE, i.e. a dummy variable that marks parent 
company industries classified by three-digit SIC codes, that turn out to be 
particularly functional for profit shifting according to research by De Simone, 
Mills and Stomberg (2014).57 Moreover, we add a dummy variable DELAWARE 
which marks companies with corporate domicile in Delaware.  
Multinational companies that seek the flexible regulatory environment of 
Delaware might be more apt or willing to engage in a flexible and tax efficient 
allocation of valuable intangibles. In addition, similar to Lindsey and Wilson 
(2015), SIZE and MARKET TO BOOK are included to control for general firm 
characteristics that may influence the decision to locate U.S. trademark ownership 
abroad. SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets and MARKET TO 
BOOK is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value of equity. Eventually, 
the vector X includes the variable FOREIGN ACTIVITIES, defined as the number 
of foreign subsidiaries of a multinational firm divided by the total number of 
subsidiaries. Companies with a strong footprint outside of the U.S. may be more 
likely to hold intangibles offshore. For example, after the acquisition of a non-
U.S. subsidiary, control and management of the associated IP might remain with 
the subsidiary just for some non-tax reasons. Summary statistics for all 
independent variables used in Equation (1) are reported in table 1. 
                                                          
57
 We classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 
(Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Offshore Decision U.S. Firms 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
US MTR 54,970 0.2142 0.3499 0.1570 0.0238 0.3500 
TRADEMARK VALUE 54,970 4.1577 4.0000 1.8166 3.0000 5.0000 
PROFITABILITY 54,970 0.4367 0.4334 0.2136 0.2637 0.5873 
ADVERT EXPENSE 54,970 0.0286 0.0050 0.0517 0.0000 0.0388 
INCOME MOBILE 54,970 0.1812 0.0000 0.3852 0.0000 0.0000 
HQ DELAWARE 54,970 0.6183 1.0000 0.4858 0.0000 1.0000 
SIZE 54,970 9.8872 9.6725 1.5140 8.6478 10.8961 
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES 54,970 0.4799 0.5667 0.2726 0.2800 0.7202 
MARKET TO BOOK 54,970 3.7911 2.8569 18.8289 1.7645 4.1466 
Notes: Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in Equation (1). Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.   
The unobserved latent variable   ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ∗௜,�,�  modeled in (1) reflects 
the net benefit from offshoring trademark ownership and our observation is 
ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ௜,�,�  = ͳ      ݅�    ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ∗௜,�,�  > Ͳ (2) 
ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ௜,�,�  = Ͳ      ݅�    ܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ∗௜,�,�  ≤ Ͳ (3) 
Assuming that the error term ε௜,�,� in equation (1) is logistically distributed, 
the probability to observe a U.S. trademark being registered by an offshore entity 
can be written as  ܲሺܱܨܨܵ�ܱܴܧ௜,�,� = ͳሻ = Λሺ�଴ +  �ଵܯܴܶ௜,�,� +  �ଶ�௜,�,� +�4�௜,�,�ሻ, where Λሺ. ሻ indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function. We 
obtain parameter estimates by estimating this model with maximum likelihood 
techniques.  
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we employ a mixed logit model 
to analyze which host country characteristics determine the location of legal 
trademark ownership conditional on offshore location. The mixed logit model has 
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been employed in other empirical analyses investigating determinants of 
ownership allocation of intangibles (Griffith et al, 2014; Dudar and Voget, 2016). 
It represents a variant of the conditional logit model, but with a random 
coefficient formulation (Train, 2003; Greene, 2012).  
To model the determinants of the geographical allocation of trademark 
ownership, we specify a mixed logit model that accommodates unobserved 
heterogeneity in preference parameters with firm i's payoff from locating legal 
ownership of trademark n in country j given as  �௜�௝ = Tax′௜௝�௜ + �′௜�௝ߜ + ߝ௜�௝ . 
The vector ܶ��௜௝ includes tax factors STR, USWHT, CFC and TMBOX. Along the 
lines of Griffith et al. (2014), we model the coefficients of the variables in ܶ��௜௝ 
with a random component, i.e.  �௜ = � + �௜ ,  with  �௜~ܰሺͲ, Σ�ሻ.58 Firm i assigns 
trademark ownership to host country ݆∗ if �௜�௝∗  > �௜�௝   ∀  ݆∗ ≠ ݆. Considering the 
probability of choosing country ݆∗ over alternatives j , conditional on realizations 
of the random part of the coefficient �௜ , gives a conditional logit model. The 
unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the random term. The 
model is estimated by using simulated maximum likelihood (Train, 2003).59 
The random coefficients are best interpreted as reflecting unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences. More intuitively, an equivalent formulation of the 
mixed logit model can be used without a random-coefficients interpretation, as 
simply representing error components that create correlations among the benefits 
for different locations (Train, 2009). These correlations over alternatives allow for 
more realistic substitution patterns than a conditional logit model. In other words, 
mixed logit does not exhibit independence from irrelevant alternatives. Referring 
                                                          
58
 This formulation is along the lines of Cameron and Trivedi (2009: 508). 
59
 We assume that each firm’s choice set consists of all foreign countries where at least one 
trademark has been assigned to. This is not particularly restrictive as all firms in our sample are 
large MNEs represented in nearly all host countries included in the sample. 
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to these two, ultimately equivalent, interpretations, the random coefficients reflect 
heterogeneity in preferences with respect to tax or, put differently, allow for 
flexible substitution patterns between choice alternatives with respect to host 
country tax factors. 
STR is the statutory corporate tax rate of a host country. In addition, we 
consider the U.S. withholding tax (USWHT) levied on royalty payments from the 
U.S. to the respective host country. We expect both tax factors to have a negative 
effect on the probability of trademark allocation to the potential host country. 
Moreover, we define a dummy variable CFC as 1, if the home country CFC 
regime, according to the respective minimum effective tax rate criteria, potentially 
applies for subsidiaries located in host country j; it is 0 otherwise. Furthermore, 
the dummy variable TM BOX indicates if a host country offers special tax 
treatment of income generated by trademark usage.  
Vector X captures gravity variables such as GDP, GDP per capita 
(GDPCAP), the geographical distance (DIST) between country-alternative j and 
the U.S., and COMLANG, a dummy that marks English speaking countries. More-
over, we include the World Bank's control of corruption perception index (CPI) as 
an indicator for the quality of institutions. We hypothesize that U.S. trademarks 
are more likely to be located in large and developed economies geographically 
and culturally close to the United States. In other words, we expect the coeffi-
cients of the gravity variables to be positive. CPI captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain on a scale from -2.5 
(weak governance) and 2.5 (strong governance). In accordance with Dharmapala 
and Hines (2009), we expect that trademark ownership is rather located in 
countries with stronger governance. Summary statistics for all independent 
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variables are reported in table 2 for U.S. firms and in table 3 for European Firms. 
Table 2: U.S. Firms’ Summary Statistics – Foreign Location Decision 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
STR 3,543 0.2972 0.3000 0.1008 0.2600 0.3660 
USWHT 3,543 0.0405 0.0000 0.0846 0.0000 0.0500 
CFC 3,543 0.5848 1.0000 0.4928 0.0000 1.0000 
TMBOX 3,543 0.0162 0.0000 0.1262 0.0000 0.0000 
GDP 3,543 27.7101 28.2069 1.6020 27.0884 28.7291 
GDPCAP 3,543 10.6045 10.6262 0.6171 10.4684 10.8266 
CPI 3,543 1.6154 1.7369 0.6023 1.3437 2.0232 
DIST 3,543 8.5404 8.7054 0.8709 8.6252 8.9960 
COMLANG 3,543 0.3878 0.0000 0.4873 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Table 2 shows U.S. firms’ descriptive statistics for all variables included in Equation (2), if LocTM 
is equal to one. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.   
Table 3: European Firms’ Summary Statistics – Foreign Location Decision 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
STR 1,513 0.2733 0.2800 0.0738 0.2225 0.3300 
USWHT 1,513 0.0230 0.0000 0.0704 0.0000 0.0000 
CFC 1,513 0.0476 0.0000 0.2130 0.0000 0.0000 
TMBOX 1,513 0.0628 0.0000 0.0243 0.0000 0.0000 
CFC 1,513 0.0476 0.0000 0.2130 0.0000 0.0000 
GDP 1,513 27.5864 27.5599 1.0901 27.0139 28.5482 
GDPCAP 1,513 10.7143 10.7408 0.6416 10.6027 10.9443 
CPI 1,513 1.7513 1.8595 0.5316 1.6390 2.0833 
DIST 1,513 8.3996 8.6769 0.8463 8.6252 8.7439 
COMLANG 1,513 0.4005 0.0000 0.4902 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Table 3 shows European firms’ descriptive statistics for all variables included in Equation (2), if 
LocTM is equal to one. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.   
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4.4. Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1. Choice between U.S. and Foreign Trademark Assignment 
The 478 S&P 500 firms included in this study designate ownership of their 
U.S. trademarks to 1.9 countries. As this average includes the U.S., this can be 
interpreted as the average use of 0.9 foreign countries.  
Figure 1: Trademark Holding by U.S. Firms 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms assigning their U.S. trademark portfolio either only to U.S. 
entities, only to non-U.S. affiliates or to both. 
However, as figure 1 illustrates the proportion of foreign ownership in U.S. 
trademark portfolios is highly skewed: 293 of the 478 S&P firms did not locate 
any of their trademarks outside the U.S. whereas five companies have assigned 
their full U.S. trademark portfolio to non-U.S. affiliates.  
Accordingly, a first view at the data reveals a strong home bias for 
trademark registrations at the USPTO. Home bias in intangible asset investment is 
already identified in previous research. For example, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) 
Firms assigning full U.S. trademark portfolio to U.S. entities
Firms assigning full U.S. trademark portfolio to to non-U.S. affiliates
Firms assigning U.S. trademark portfolio to to U.S. and non-U.S. entities
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find that, on average, European MNEs file 57.1 percent of their patent 
applications at the European Patent Office in the name of the parent company. 
The home bias in trademark registrations submitted by U.S. MNEs at the USPTO, 
however, is much more pronounced. Specifically, 95.7 percent of the 81,766 U.S. 
trademarks registered by S&P firms between 2003 and 2012 were owned by U.S. 
entities. Thus, the proportion (number) of trademarks these firms hold outside the 
U.S. amounts to only 4.3 percent (3,543 trademarks). Still, these foreign held 
trademarks spread over a remarkable number of countries. In total, 40 countries 
turn out to be holding locations for registered U.S. trademarks in S&P 500 firms.60 
On average, a U.S. firm locates 5 percent of its U.S. trademarks offshore. Figure 2 
illustrates these relations. 
                                                          
60
 U.S. firms located their U.S. trademark ownership in the following countries: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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Figure 2: U.S. Firms – Distribution of Trademark Ownership 
 
Notes: Figure 2 shows the distribution of trademark ownership to entities located in the U.S. or a foreign 
country for all trademarks registered by U.S. firms. For trademark ownership allocated to U.S. entities, the 
column “trademarks owned by U.S. entities” shows the distribution of trademark ownership to entities 
located in Delaware or other U.S. states. For trademark ownership allocated to foreign countries, the column 
“trademarks owned by foreign subsidiaries” shows the distribution of trademark ownership to tax haven and 
non-tax haven countries. The definition for tax havens follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
Notably, the tax treatment of intangible assets is not homogenous even 
within the U.S., but rather varies considerably across the federal states. In 
particular, Delaware is acknowledged to be a domestic U.S. tax haven. Delaware 
exempts income derived from intangible assets from state-level taxes. By 
transferring their intangibles to Delaware, firms can thus achieve permanent tax 
savings and lower their effective state tax rates on average by 0.7-1.1 percentage 
points and thus their U.S. state income tax burden by 15-24 percent compared to 
firms that do not base their tax planning strategy on Delaware’s tax system 
(Dyreng, Lindsey and Thornock, 2013; Lindsey and Wilson, 2015). Using our 
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matched data sample, we can consider and compare the level of U.S. trademark 
ownership, in terms of trademark registrations at the USPTO, concentrated in the 
domestic U.S. tax haven Delaware relative to foreign non-U.S. tax havens (figure 
2). In total numbers, U.S. firms locate 43,770 trademarks, i.e. 53.5 percent of all 
successful registrations, in Delaware while they locate only 587 trademarks in 
foreign tax haven countries.61  
Taking into account the pattern of trademark allocation, we assume a two-
step location choice as the underlying decision process. The first choice is whether 
to locate trademark ownership in a third country, while the location choice is only 
the second step. Therefore, we start with an analysis of the determinants of 
assigning a trademark offshore. We use the logistic regression approach described 
in Section 4.3 which considers OFFSHORE as dependent variable. Table 4 
presents the respective results.   
                                                          
61
 Note: Our tax haven definition follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).  
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Table 4: U.S. Firms –Choice between U.S. and Foreign Trademark 
Assignment 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
US MTR -0.217 -0.246 0.160 
 
(0.679) (0.684) (0.647) 
TRADEMARK VALUE 
 
0.179*** 0.176*** 
  
(0.053) (0.054) 
PROFITABILITY 
 
 -0.343 
  
 (0.776) 
ADVERT EXPENSE 
 
 -2.043 
  
 (5.485) 
INCOME MOBILE 
 
 0.829 
  
 (0.800) 
HQ DELAWARE 
 
 0.917** 
  
 (0.395) 
SIZE 0.011 0.008 0.027 
 
(0.192) (0.193) (0.169) 
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES 3.148*** 2.882*** 2.665*** 
 
(0.813) (0.774) (0.822) 
MARKET TO BOOK -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 54,970 54,970 54,970 
Notes: Table 4 presents results from logit regressions with OFFSHORE as dependent variable. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firms. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** 
show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
In column (1) we only consider some firm level control variables and the 
U.S. marginal tax rate (US MTR). In column (2) we add our measure for the 
trademark value and in column (3) we consider additional variables that capture 
incentives for international tax planning. The results show that most of the firm 
characteristics do not contribute much to explain the offshore decision. Only the 
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size of foreign activities is associated with a higher probability to hold a 
trademark offshore.  
Interestingly, our results suggest that the U.S. marginal tax rate of the firm 
(US MTR) does not play a decisive role in the decision whether to locate U.S. 
trademark ownership abroad. However, the probability to hold a trademark abroad 
is significantly higher, if the firm has chosen the state of Delaware as headquarter 
location. This finding suggests a firm that has already considered an attractive 
regulatory and tax environment into account might also be aware of international 
tax planning opportunities associated with trademark offshoring.  
Finally, our results show that a higher trademark value increases the 
probability of holding a trademark abroad. This finding might also hint at tax 
planning considerations because more valuable trademarks are associated with 
more profit shifting opportunities. We therefore expect tax considerations to play 
a more decisive role, if the decision to assign trademark ownership to a foreign 
affiliate is taken.  
4.4.2. Foreign Trademark Assignments of U.S. Firms 
The S&P firms do not solely locate the ownership for their U.S. trademarks 
inside the U.S., they also assign 3,543 trademarks to non-U.S. affiliates. 587 of 
these are located in nine tax haven countries (Barbados, Bermuda, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Switzerland and Uruguay), i.e. 
16.57 percent of the offshore trademarks are located in foreign tax haven 
countries.  
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Table 5: U.S. Firms – Top 10 Countries by Total and Average Number of 
Registrations 
 
Notes: Table 5 shows the top 10 countries of U.S. trademark ownership location regarding the total number of 
registrations (left) and the average number of registrations per firm that registered U.S. trademarks by 
affiliates located in the respective country (right) for the S&P 500 firms. Trademarks owned by entities 
located in the U.S. are not considered. Countries marked with a * are tax havens following Dyreng and 
Lindsey’s (2009) definition.   
Table 5 shows the top ten countries in terms of the total number of U.S. 
trademarks owned by subsidiaries located in these countries (left) and the average 
number of U.S. trademarks owned by subsidiaries located in a country per firm 
(right). Interestingly, considering the total number of trademarks U.S. companies 
locate most trademarks in countries with rather high tax rates like Japan, Canada 
and Germany.  
If no double tax treaty is in place, the U.S. withholds a 30 percent tax on 
royalty payments paid to a foreign entity. Interestingly, the U.S. signed double tax 
treaties that reduce the withholding tax on royalty payments with most of the 
countries presented in Table 5. For this reason, especially Ireland and Switzerland 
are interesting options for the location of trademark ownership as they have 
agreed with the U.S. on a withholding tax of zero percent on royalty payments. 
Considering the average number of U.S. trademarks owned by subsidiaries 
located in a country per firm, Table 4 shows that tax havens become more 
important. Two tax haven countries rank among the top five trademark locations 
country total number of registrations country average number of 
registrations per firm
Japan 598 Japan 85.43
Great Britain 502 Bermuda * 37.00
Germany 444 Ireland * 16.63
Canada 326 Turkey 12.33
Netherlands 273 Sweden 11.00
Switzerland * 202 Netherlands 10.50
Bermuda * 185 Germany 10.09
Sweden 165 Finland 8.80
Ireland * 133 Switzerland * 8.08
France 123 Great Britain 7.49
United States 78,223 United States 165.73
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of U.S. MNEs, whereas no tax haven figured among the top five for the total 
number of registrations. One of these tax haven countries (Ireland) combines tax 
haven status with a withholding tax of zero percent on royalties received from the 
U.S. In sum, the explorative analysis indicates that tax havens are not excessively 
sought in the geographical allocation of trademark ownership. However, those 
firms which actually allocate their U.S. trademarks to tax havens tend to do so in a 
more extensive way. 
Previous literature shows that tax haven operations and intangible asset 
ownership is associated with additional tax avoidance (Harris, 1993; Grubert, 
2003; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a and 2012b). Therefore, we expect a 
different pattern of trademark ownership, in particular, for firms with high 
intangible asset ownership or intense tax haven activities.62 
                                                          
62
 Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3: U.S. Firms – Trademarks owned by entities located offshore 
 
Notes: Figure 3 shows the distribution of trademark ownership located in foreign countries distinguished 
between tax haven countries and other foreign countries for the S&P 500 firms. The definition for tax havens 
follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). The first bar includes all U.S. firms of our sample, the second bar 
includes only firms in the upper quartile of the share of intangible assets to total assets; the third bar includes 
only firms in the quartile with the lowest ETR; and the fourth bar includes only firms in the upper quartile of 
number of affiliates located in a tax haven scaled by total number of affiliates.  
Figure 3 however depicts only a meaningful difference for firms with 
extensive use of tax haven subsidiaries. They locate 34.58 percent of their third-
country trademarks in tax havens while all S&P 500 firms do only locate 16.57 
percent there. Firms with a high share of intangible assets locate only slightly 
more trademarks in tax havens (20.37 percent). We find similar results for the 
relation of the average number of registrations per third country to the average 
number of registrations per tax haven used. Only firms with intense tax haven 
operations locate on average a considerably higher amount of trademarks (11.75) 
in each tax haven country. 
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Effective tax rates (ETRs) are well-accepted proxies for the overall tax 
avoidance of a firm, as a lower ETR suggests that a firm is more effectively 
avoiding income taxes compared to firms with higher ETRs (Dyreng and Lindsey, 
2009). Interestingly, firms with low ETRs do not locate more trademarks in tax 
haven countries. They even locate slightly less trademarks at tax havens (15.12 
percent).  
In sum, the descriptive results of table 5 and figure 3 show that trademark 
ownership is not primarily located in tax haven countries, but rather in other 
countries.   
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Table 6: U.S. Firms – Mixed Logit Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Random Variables 
      
STR -9.494*** 18.39*** -13.31*** 17.74*** -5.775*** 18.39*** 
  (1.973) (1.369) (2.631) 1,769 (1.943) (1.369) 
USWHT 
  
-14.29*** 13.29*** -7.821*** 19.60*** 
  
  
(1,557) 1,197 (1.718) (2.169) 
CFC 
    
-0.198 -3.028*** 
  
    
(0.263) (0.416) 
TMBOX 
    
0.806** 1.256*** 
  
    
(0.405) (0.414) 
Fixed Variables 
      
GDP -0.200* 
 
-0.181 
 
-0.192** 
 
  (0.115) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.0928) 
 
GDPCAP 1.206*** 
 
0.954*** 
 
0.933*** 
 
  (0.118) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.119) 
 
DIST -0.392*** 
 
-0.253** 
 
-0.290** 
 
  (0.108) 
 
(0.0989) 
 
(0.116) 
 
CPI 1.170*** 
 
0.660** 
 
0.657** 
 
  (0.268) 
 
(0.289) 
 
(0.261) 
 
COMLANG 0.0121 
 
0.186 
 
0,152 
 
  (0.370) 
 
(0.324) 
 
(0.302) 
 
N 141,720 
 
141,720 
 
141,720 
 
Notes: Table 6 presents the mixed logit estimates for U.S. firms. 3,543 positive trademark registrations from 
third countries are included. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
In order to analyze whether host country tax incentives determine foreign 
trademark assignment of U.S. firms, we use the mixed logit approach described in 
Section 4.3. Table 6 presents the basic results for the mixed logit regression. The 
results suggest that a higher corporate tax rate (STR) leads to a lower probability 
139 
that a trademark is located in the respective host country. The same effect can be 
observed for USWHT. A higher withholding tax levied by the U.S. on royalty 
payments to a host country leads to a lower probability that a trademark is located 
there. For both, STR and USWHT, our results are highly statistically significant 
across all specifications. Moreover, the results in table 6 confirm that firms 
respond heterogeneously to taxes. The highly significant standard deviations for 
our random coefficients indicate that parameters do indeed vary among firms. 
Interestingly, the U.S. CFC rule as well as preferential tax regimes for income 
generated by trademarks (so called trademark boxes) to do not significantly affect 
the location choice of trademarks. 
Concerning our control variables, we find coefficients that are in line with 
our expectations. We find a statistically significant positive relationship for GDP 
per Capita and CPI as well as a negative for geographical distance (DIST).   
Table 7: U.S. Firms – Base Probabilities 
 Country Base Probability  
 Canada 0.1225  
 Japan 0.1122  
 Germany 0.1117  
 Great Britain 0.1048  
 Ireland * 0.0900  
 Bermuda * 0.0676  
 Switzerland * 0.0478  
 France 0.0388  
 Netherlands 0.0381  
 Hong Kong * 0.0288  
Notes: Table 7 presents the predicted base probabilities 
after regression 1 of table 6 for the top 10 countries 
regarding base probability. Countries marked with a * are 
tax havens following Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) 
definition. 
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As the results presented in table 6 cannot be interpreted quantitatively, we 
predict base probabilities for our results of column (1). The base probabilities of 
the most preferred countries are presented in table 7. The predicted base 
probabilities for one country to be chosen as location for U.S. trademarks vary 
from above ten percent to below one percent. In table 5, we identified Japan as the 
most popular foreign trademark location concerning the total as well as the 
average number of registrations per firm. Our predicted probabilities confirm this 
observation as Japan is among the most popular countries with a base probability 
of 0.1122. Only Canada (0.1225) has a higher base probability. In line with our 
observations in the descriptive part, we find that tax havens are amongst the most 
popular countries, but do not dominate extensively. Other high-tax third countries 
like Canada, Japan and Germany are chosen with much higher probabilities. 
Moreover, our approach allows us to identify which tax havens are preferred by 
U.S. firms. We find that they rather use Ireland (0.0900), Bermuda (0.0676) and 
Switzerland (0.0478) than Barbados (0.00005), Marshall Islands (0.00009) and 
Luxembourg (0.0007) for the location of their U.S. trademarks.  
The benefit of our mixed logit model is that it does not only allow us to 
simulate the probability firms locate their trademark in a certain country, but also 
enables us to find out how a change in a host country STR affects this probability 
as well as the probabilities of other host countries. In the following, we simulate 
how a one percentage point decrease in STR of certain countries would affect the 
probability a trademark is located in the countries we identified as the most 
popular countries in table 7. Table 8 presents the result as relative change 
compared to the base probability in the original scenario. 
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Table 8: U.S. Firms – Cross Semi-Elasticities 
  Canada Japan Germany Great Britain Ireland Bermuda Switzerland France Netherlands Hong Kong 
Canada 2.473 1.183 0.382 -0.662 -0.650 -0.216 -0.484 0.042 -0.261 -0.268 
Japan 1.229 -4.585 1.966 0.115 -0.123 -0.022 -0.088 0.562 0.047 -0.054 
Germany 0.206 1.720 0.745 -0.386 -0.523 -0.157 -0.364 0.142 -0.210 -0.203 
Great Britain -0.858 0.188 -0.461 8.637 -1.534 -0.584 -0.904 -0.180 -0.511 -0.568 
Ireland -1.161 -0.146 -0.710 -1.927 21.786 -6.517 -2.139 -0.230 -0.837 -1.882 
Bermuda -0.534 -0.035 -0.282 -0.977 -9.413 18.174 -1.674 -0.078 -0.477 -1.894 
Switzerland -1.293 -0.182 -0.833 -1.967 -3.692 -2.033 17.887 -0.295 -0.782 -1.154 
France 0.145 1.864 0.440 -0.543 -0.548 -0.136 -0.366 0.779 -0.184 -0.221 
Netherlands -0.858 0.205 -0.402 -1.257 -1.652 -0.640 -0.911 -0.174 9.762 -0.553 
Hong Kong -1.293 -0.190 -0.821 -2.056 -5.388 -3.839 -1.943 -0.279 -0.854 23.716 
Notes: Table 8 presents the cross semi-elasticities for a one percentage point cut in STR.   
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Interestingly, we find that trademark assignment to Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Bermuda and Switzerland which are all defined as tax havens react most 
pronounced to a tax rate cut. Ireland as the most popular tax haven considering 
base probabilities is chosen with 21.8 percent higher probability compared to the 
probability of 0.09 before a tax rate cut. In other words, Ireland is chosen with a 
base probability of 0.1096 after a tax rate cut. Translated into trademarks this 
means an increase of about 68 trademarks.  
Trademarks can either refer to single goods or wider product lines (Cabral, 
2000). Interestingly, the USPTO dataset provides information for how many of 
potentially 52 classes of goods and services a trademark is registered. Following 
Sandner and Block (2011), we assume that the value of a trademark positively 
correlates with the number of classes it covers. This assumption seems plausible, 
because a successful registration requires the owner of the application to prove the 
actual use of the trademark for each individual class of goods or services it is 
supposed to cover.  
Firms in our dataset protect their trademarks for between one and eight 
classes. We classify trademarks covering one or two classes as having low value 
whereas trademarks covering seven or eight classes are considered to be of high 
value. We find that the S&P 500 firms included in this study designate ownership 
of 4.35 percent of their less valuable U.S. trademarks covering one or two classes 
of goods or services to entities outside the U.S. while they locate 6.72 percent of 
their more valuable trademarks there. This indicates that firms locate their 
trademarks covering more classes rather in foreign countries.  
Therefore, we re-run our regression for two sub-groups: The first group 
contains trademarks covering one or two classes of goods and services (low 
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value). The second sub-group pitches on trademarks covering seven or eight 
classes (high value).  
Table 9: U.S. Firms – Low and High Value Trademarks 
  (1) (2) 
  low value high value 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Random Variables 
    
STR -5.938 *** 15.244*** -3.693* 14.395*** 
  (2.027) (2.486) (2.100) (3.262) 
Fixed Variables 
    
GDP 0.072 
 
0.117 
 
  (0.210) 
 
(0.164) 
 
GDPCAP 0.806*** 
 
1.264*** 
 
  (0.089) 
 
(0.122) 
 
CPI 0.222 
 
0.732*** 
 
  (0.322) 
 
(0.255) 
 
DIST -0.655*** 
 
-0.462* 
 
  (0.192) 
 
(0.245) 
 
COMLANG 0.156 
 
0.283 
 
  (0.599) 
 
(0.314) 
 
N 22,440 
 
23,840 
 
Notes: Table 9 presents the mixed logit estimates for sub-groups of the sample. Both, specification (1) and 
specification (2) consider only trademarks allocated to non-U.S. subsidiaries. Specification (1) considers 
only trademarks covering 1 or 2 classes of goods and services (low value). Specification (2) considers only 
trademarks covering 7 or 8 classes of goods and services (high value). Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 9 presents the results for these sub-group regressions. We can confirm 
our main results, which show that tax rates have a negative impact on the 
probability that a third country is chosen as trademark location. However, we 
cannot confirm that tax havens play a more important role for trademarks of high 
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value than for those being of low value. Concerning base probabilities predicted 
after specifications (1) and (2) of table 9, Canada, Japan and Germany stay among 
the four most popular countries for both, low value and high value, trademarks.  
4.4.3. Comparison to Foreign Trademark Assignments of European Firms 
In additional analysis, we compare the location of U.S. trademark ownership 
of U.S. firms to European firms. Our data covers 235 STOXX Europe 600 firms. 
These firms registered 14,984 new U.S. trademarks during the same time period. 
Similar to U.S. firms, we find a strong home as well as a U.S. bias for European 
firms. The analysis of European firms allows distinguishing between holding a 
trademark in the home country of the firm and holding a trademark in the country 
of use, here the U.S. As figure 4 illustrates, 51.22 percent of the 14,984 U.S. 
trademarks newly registered by European firms between 2003 and 2012 are 
indeed held in the sixteen respective home countries63 while 38.68 percent are 
located in the United States. The proportion of U.S. trademarks these firms hold 
neither in their respective parent countries nor in the U.S. is only 10.1 percent. 
                                                          
63
 Home country means the country where the global ultimate owner is domiciled according to 
Amadeus. 
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Figure 4: European Firms – Distribution of Trademark Ownership 
 
Notes: Figure 4 shows the distribution of trademark ownership to entities located in the U.S., the home 
country or a third country where third country is every country that is not the U.S. nor the home country for 
all trademarks registered by STOXX 600 Europe firms. For trademark ownership allocated to U.S. entities, 
the column “trademarks owned by U.S. companies” shows the distribution of trademark ownership to 
entities located in Delaware or other U.S. states. For trademark ownership allocated to third countries, the 
column “trademarks owned by third country subsidiaries” shows the distribution of trademark ownership to 
tax haven and non-tax haven countries. The definition for tax havens follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
Nonetheless, U.S. trademark ownership within these STOXX 600 firms 
spread over 37 different third countries of which 24 are home country for neither 
of these firms. On average, each firm designates U.S. trademark ownership to 2.6 
different countries. However, the proportion of third country ownership in U.S. 
trademark portfolios is again skewed: 109 of the 235 STOXX 600 companies 
locate their full U.S. trademark portfolio either in the U.S. or their home country, 
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but never in a third country. Only six firms locate all of their U.S. trademarks 
neither in the U.S. nor their home country, but in some third country.64  
Considering tax haven usage by the STOXX 600 MNEs, the data show that 
3,264 (i.e. 56.3 percent) of those U.S. trademarks which were filed from within 
the U.S. are held in Delaware, the U.S. tax haven. This contrasts with 404 U.S. 
trademarks designated to third country tax havens. Still, those 404 trademarks 
represent 26.70 percent of all third-country trademarks filed in foreign non-U.S. 
tax havens which is a disproportionally high share given that only seven of the 37 
third countries recorded used the European MNEs are tax havens (Bermuda, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, Switzerland and Uruguay).  
In the following, we include only trademarks located in third countries in 
our analysis. Considering ETR as measure of the overall tax avoidance of 
European MNEs, low ETR firms locate 44.55 percent of their third country 
trademark ownership in tax havens while all firms locate only 26.70 percent there. 
This indicates that low ETR firms tend to geographically allocate their trademarks 
more tax efficiently than other sub-groups.  
                                                          
64
 Third country is every country that is neither the U.S. nor the home country of a firm.  
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Table 10: European Firms – Top 10 Countries by Total and Average 
Number of Registrations 
 
Notes: Table 10 shows the top 10 countries of trademark ownership location regarding the total number of 
registrations (left) and the average number of registrations per firm that registered trademarks by affiliates 
located in the respective country (right) for STOXX firms. Only trademarks owned by entities located in third 
countries are considered. Countries marked with a * are tax havens following Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) 
definition.   
Table 10 shows the top ten third countries in terms of the total number of 
U.S. trademarks located there (left) and the average number of U.S. trademarks 
located in a third country per European firm (right). In contrast to U.S. firms, for 
European firms not only high-tax countries rank among the top three countries, 
but also the tax haven Switzerland. Once again, tax haven countries gain of impor-
tance, if we consider the average number of trademarks owned by subsidiaries 
located in a third country per firm. European firms locate most trademarks in Ire-
land and Switzerland, which combine tax haven status with a withholding tax of 
zero percent on royalties received from the U.S. Interestingly, Ireland seems to be 
an interesting tax efficient location for both, U.S. and European firms. Similar to 
the analysis for U.S. firms, our explorative analysis for European firms indicates 
that overall tax havens are not excessively sought in the geographical allocation of 
U.S. trademark ownership. However, those firms which actually allocate their 
U.S. trademarks to tax havens tend to do so in an extensive way. 
country total number of registrations country average number of 
registrations per firm
Home Country 7,675 United States 39.43
United States 5,796 Home Country 35.53
Switzerland * 226 Ireland * 16.63
Netherlands 217 Switzerland * 14.13
Great Britain 215 Netherlands 9.43
Canada 198 Great Britain 8.60
Germany 183 Colombia 8.00
Ireland * 133 Bermuda * 7.00
France 79 El Salvador 7.00
Luxembourg * 23 Canada 6.39
Japan 23 Germany 6.31
Australia 22 France 4.94
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Table 11: European Firms – Mixed Logit Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Random Variables 
      
STR -7.659** 10.510*** -5.076* 11.54*** -7.089** 13.83*** 
  (3.379) (2.956) (2.948) (1.230) (3.031) (1.586) 
USWHT 
  
-8.277*** 22.66*** -17.13*** 26.170*** 
  
  
(-1.528) (2.342) (3.006) (5.035) 
CFC  
    
-1.198*** 4.555*** 
  
    
(0.383) (0.549) 
TMBOX 
    
-5.969** 7.622*** 
     (2.780) (2.209) 
Fixed Variables 
      
GDP 0.087 
 
0.102 
 
0.0042 
 
  (0.162) 
 
(0.243) 
 
(0.221) 
 
GDPCAP 1.205*** 
 
0.937*** 
 
1.000*** 
 
  (0.259) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.225) 
 
CPI -0.551*** 
 
-0.499*** 
 
-0.526** 
 
  (0.143) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.242) 
 
DIST 1.233*** 
 
0.772*** 
 
0.774*** 
 
  (0.291) 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.284) 
 
COMLANG -0.450  -0.364  -0.328  
  (0.504)  (0.669)  (0.644)  
N 55,981 
 
55,981 
 
55,981 
 
Notes: Table 11 presents the mixed logit estimates for European firms. 1,513 positive trademark registrations 
from third countries are included. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 11 presents mixed logit regression results for the European firms. 
Similar to the results for U.S. firms in Table 6, we can confirm that European 
firms respond heterogeneously on taxes. Once again, we find coefficients that are 
in line with our expectations. For both, STR and USWHT, our results are highly 
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statistically significant. Our result for CFC is also in line with our expectations. If 
a CFC rule is potentially applicable on the royalties deriving from the respective 
trademark, this country is chosen with a lower probability.65 Thus, our results 
suggest a somewhat different effect of CFC rules of European countries and the 
U.S. While European CFC rules affect trademark location choices, the U.S. 
Subpart F rule does not. This finding might be explained by well-known strategies 
to circumvent application of Subpart F like “check-the-box”. With regard to 
trademark boxes (TMBOX), we find a negative effect. The sign of the effects 
might be also attributed to the effectiveness of European CFC rules because the 
low tax rates applicable under a trademark box regime are subject to the CFC 
rules of the home countries. 
Concerning our fixed variables, we find a statistically significant positive 
relationship for GDP per Capita and CPI as well as a negative for geographical 
distance (DIST). 
                                                          
65
 Our CFC Dummy does not consider the Cadbury-Schweppes decision of the European Court of 
Justice. To make sure that our results are not influenced by this, we repeated the regression 
considering that CFC rules are not applicable within the European Union after the decision. The 
results are similar to those reported in this paper. 
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Table 12: European Firms – Base Probabilities 
 Country Base Probability  
 Canada 0.1684  
 Germany 0.1371  
 Japan 0.0919  
 Great Britain 0.0897  
 Switzerland * 0.0699  
 France 0.0698  
 Netherlands 0.0627  
 Ireland * 0.0464  
 Sweden 0.0346  
 Denmark 0.0305  
Notes: Table 12 presents the predicted base probabilities 
after regression 1 of table 11 for the top 10 countries 
regarding base probability. Countries marked with a * are 
tax havens following Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) 
definition. 
We again predict base probabilities for some countries. Table 12 presents 
the predicted base probabilities for those countries being the most popular 
countries concerning base probabilities. Interestingly, European MNEs choose tax 
havens with a lower base probability than U.S. firms.  
The top four countries chosen with the highest probability by European 
firms are the same countries as for U.S. firms. In particular, these countries are 
Canada, Germany, Great Britain and Japan which are all rather high-tax countries. 
Though, sorted by base probability the order differs. Once again, we do not 
identify tax haven countries among the most popular countries. If European firms 
decide to locate their trademark in a tax haven, they choose Switzerland (0.0699) 
and Ireland (0.0464) with the highest probability. Rather unpopular tax haven 
countries are Uruguay (0.0004) and Luxembourg (0.0023). 
Once again, we test whether trademarks covering 7 or more classes are 
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rather located in low tax jurisdictions by repeating our regression for this sub-
group and predicting base probabilities afterwards.66 Similar to the results for U.S. 
firms, we cannot confirm that low tax countries are more preferred than high tax 
countries for the location of valuable trademarks.  
For European firms, we do also simulate the reaction to a one percentage 
point decrease in STR for those countries identified as most popular in table 12. 
Table 13 presents the cross semi-elasticities.  
                                                          
66
 Results are reported in Appendix 4. 
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Table 13: European Firms – Cross Semi-Elasticities 
 
Canada Germany Japan UK Switzerland France Netherlands Ireland Sweden Denmark 
Canada 4.664 -0.468 0.136 -0.633 -0.694 -0.197 -0.475 -0.430 -0.262 -0.238 
Germany -0.650 4.160 0.243 -0.509 -0.589 -0.138 -0.440 -0.386 -0.228 -0.220 
Japan 0.252 0.390 0.051 -0.161 -0.226 0.261 -0.117 -0.137 -0.067 -0.067 
UK -1.279 -0.866 -0.136 8.365 -1.055 -0.389 -0.709 -0.803 -0.390 -0.360 
Switzerland -1.736 -1.197 -0.288 -1.359 13.015 -0.537 -1.050 -1.719 -0.567 -0.533 
France -0.462 -0.274 0.435 -0.518 -0.519 3.607 -0.368 -0.364 -0.206 -0.192 
Netherlands -1.333 -0.921 -0.158 -0.960 -1.121 -0.411 9.253 -0.919 -0.408 -0.389 
Ireland -1.954 -1.300 -0.267 -1.644 -2.679 -0.538 -1.367 17.913 -0.713 -0.693 
Sweden -1.294 -0.914 -0.159 -1.011 -1.122 -0.419 -0.751 -0.920 9.648 -0.383 
Denmark -1.387 -0.984 -0.194 -1.042 -1.195 -0.440 -0.812 -0.995 -0.434 10.363 
Notes: Table 13 presents the cross semi-elasticities for a one percentage point cut in STR.   
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Interestingly, once again the tax haven countries identified as popular in 
table 12 are those benefiting the most from their own tax rate decrease. Ireland’s 
base probability increases about 17.9 percent and Switzerland’s about 13 percent. 
Transferred into a number of trademarks this indicates an increase of trademark 
assignments of 13 trademarks for Ireland and 14 trademarks for Switzerland. 
Compared to the reaction of U.S. firms to a one percentage point decrease in 
Ireland’s STR, European firms react less sensitive. 
Overall, our results indicate that U.S. and European firms choose to locate 
the ownership of their trademarks used in the U.S. market rather in the U.S. or 
their home country. If they decide to locate the ownership in a third country, the 
most popular countries are most likely not particular tax attractive. However, we 
are able to identify that tax considerations play a significant role in the selection 
of trademark host countries for trademarks used in the U.S. market. For both, U.S. 
and European firms, the tax havens Ireland and Switzerland are amongst the most 
popular trademark ownership locations whereas Bermuda and Hong Kong are 
more preferred by U.S. firms. However, U.S. firms react slightly more sensitive to 
a tax rate decrease than European firms. Nevertheless, this sensitivity results in 
about 50 trademark assignments less for certain tax havens. Considering that 
Krasnikov, Mishra and Orozco (2009) estimate on average $ 7.8 million of future 
cash flows for each additional registration of a brand-association trademark, this 
difference can be seen as a notable profit shifting potential for the respective 
firms.  
  
154 
4.5. Conclusion 
It is well-known that firms profit from tax planning strategies enabling them 
to shift profits to low-tax countries. Even though prior literature confirms the 
importance of intellectual property for these strategies, little is known about the 
actual location of intellectual property. We therefore analyze the role that tax 
considerations play in the allocation of trademark ownership to foreign 
subsidiaries. This paper uses a new and unique dataset that links the location of 
trademarks registered by MNEs for the U.S. market with group structures of large 
MNEs from the U.S. (S&P 500) and Europe (STOXX Europe 600). We analyze 
whether tax incentives play a decisive role in the legal assignment of U.S. 
trademarks to entities outside the U.S.  
Interestingly, we identify for both, U.S. and European MNEs, a strong 
home-bias. However, our findings indicate also the importance of tax 
considerations, if a firm decides to assign trademark ownership to an affiliate 
located in a foreign country. We find a statistically significant negative 
relationship between host country tax rates as well as U.S. withholding taxes and 
trademark location choice.  
Admittedly, interpreting our results from an economical perspective 
indicates that profit shifting with the use of trademarks is limited. Our results 
suggest that U.S. firms react to a corporate tax rate decrease of one percentage 
point in Ireland with an increase in trademark assignment of about 70 trademarks. 
The numbers suggest a limited effect of tax considerations within the process of 
trademark location considering that U.S. firms registered 81,766 new trademarks 
in our research period. The same is true for European firms though European 
firms react even less sensitive to tax rate decreases. 
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One explanation for our results might be the nature of trademarks. In 
contrast to patents, most investments in trademarks are undertaken after the 
geographical assignment. Tax sensitive firms usually try to locate their income to 
low tax countries while they prefer to generate their expenses at high tax 
countries. As transfer pricing rules require that investments undertaken for the 
establishment of a trademark by a trademark’s user have to be considered in the 
analysis of functions, the potential to locate expenses at high tax countries and 
income at low tax countries for trademarks is limited. 
Our results contribute to the ongoing debate on BEPS and the current 
discussion about the use of intellectual property for aggressive tax planning 
strategies resulting in low ETRs. Besides showing where U.S. and European firms 
actually locate the ownership some kind of intellectual property (trademarks), we 
are able to identify that firms integrate tax considerations to a limited degree in 
their decision process. However, most firms locate their trademarks rather in other 
countries.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
ADVERT EXPENSE advertising expense (xad) scaled by total assets (at) 
CFC 
Dummy variable with the value one if the home 
country CFC regime, according to the respective 
minimum effective tax rate criteria, potentially applies 
for subsidiaries located in host country j; it is 0 
otherwise 
COMLANG 
Dummy variable with the value of one if English is an 
official language in the host country (Source: World 
Bank) 
CPI Control of Corruption Index (Source: World Bank, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators) 
DIST Distance between U.S. and country i (Source: CEPII 
GEODIST) 
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES Share of foreign subsidiaries in total number of 
subsidiaries 
GDP Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (Source: 
World Bank) 
GDPCAP Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (Source: World Bank) 
HQ DELAWARE Dummy variable with the value of one if the 
headquarter of the firm is located in Delaware 
INCOME MOBILE 
Dummy variable with the value of one if the parent 
company belongs to the following three-digit SIC 
codes: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 
(Computers) and 738 (Services). 
MARKET TO BOOK ratio of a firm’s market value (prcc_f) to its book 
value (bkvlps) 
OFFSHORE Dummy variable with the value of one if trademark 
ownership is assigned to an affiliate located offshore. 
PROFITABILITY ratio of gross profit (gp) to total sales (sale) 
SIZE natural logarithm of total assets (at) 
157 
STR Statutory corporate tax rate of the host country 
TMBOX 
Dummy variable indicating host countries that offer a 
special tax rate for income from trademark usage 
(trademark box) 
TRADEMARK VALUE Number of classes a trademark is registered for 
(Source: USPTO) 
US MTR firm’s simulated marginal U.S. federal corporate 
income tax rate based on Graham (1996) 
USWHT Withholding tax rate levied on royalty payments of 
U.S. entities to foreign countries 
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Appendix 2: Sample Selection 
 
  
U.S. firms number of firms number of trademarks
Registering Firms being in the S&P 500 Index in 2007 536 85,911
Firms having neither headquarters nor incorporation in the U.S. 27 4,094
509 81,817
Missing country characteristics 31 195
Sample 478 81,622
European Firms number of firms number of trademarks
Registering Firms being in the STOXX Europe 600 Index in 2007 235 14,996
Missing country characteristics 0 12
Sample 235 14,984
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Appendix 3: Home Countries of European Firms 
Home Country Number of Firms 
Austria 2 
Belgium 2 
Denmark 6 
Finland 13 
France 38 
Germany 29 
Great Britain 88 
Ireland 5 
Italy 3 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 13 
Norway 4 
Portugal 1 
Spain 12 
Sweden 16 
Switzerland 1 
Total 235 
Notes: Appendix 3 presents the Home Country for 
the STOXX 600 Europe firms. 
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Appendix 4: European Firms – Low and High Value Trademarks 
  (1) (2) 
  low value high value 
Random Variables 
 
  
  
STR -15.474*** 12.906*** -10.898** 12.726*** 
  (3.392) (2.121) (5.152) (2.496) 
Fixed Variables 
 
  
  
GDP 0.002   -0.025 
 
  (0.248)   (0.236) 
 
GDPCAP 1.693***   1.483*** 
 
  (0.202)   (0.427) 
 
CPI 1.711***   1.513*** 
 
  (0.485)   (0.355) 
 
DIST -0.318   -0.544*** 
 
  (0.278)   (0.175) 
 
COMLANG -0.334   -0.706** 
 
  (0.887)   (0.322) 
 
N 14,430 
 
9,842 
 
Notes: Appendix 4 presents the mixed logit estimates for sub-groups of the European firm sample. Both, 
specification (1) and specification (2) consider only trademarks allocated to third country subsidiaries. 
Specification (1) considers only covering 1 or 2 classes of goods and services (low value). Specification 
(2) considers only trademarks covering 7 or 8 classes of goods and services (high value). Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** show 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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